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Foreword 
Responding to the lack of in-depth research into the effects of R&D grants for young 
innovative firms with growth potential, the study examines how they impact upon firms' 
employment, firm economic and innovative performance, and firm innovative activities. 
Drawing on both policy evaluations and empirical literature relating to R&D programmes 
and firms' output, it contributes to this growing field of research through discussing the 
complex relationship between the two, comparing different types of R&D Programmes 
(namely generic R&D grants, and R&D subsidies) and analysing the wider policy 
implications.  
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Executive summary 
This policy report explores the role of R&D grant schemes in supporting young innovative 
firms with growth potential. It uses primarily literature from the Science direct and 
Scopus databases, and available policy evaluations. The analysis focuses on the impact 
of R&D grant schemes on companies' outcomes such innovation, employment, and 
economic and innovative performance, with the intent of providing evidence that could 
inform current and future R&I policy. 
Main findings 
R&D grants for young innovative companies with growth perspective: 
 Increase employment: Evidence shows that between 36-55 percent of 
beneficiaries report an increase in employment. It is confirmed by the evidence from 
econometric studies (Girma et al., 2010, and Soderblom et al., 2015). 
 Increase both total sales, and share of innovative sales. Evidence from both 
econometric studies and policy evaluations prove that those grants significantly 
increase total sales and share of innovative sales. The percentage of surveyed 
beneficiaries reporting an increase in total sales after the grant range between 33% 
and 92%.  
 The effect on sales growth persists for several years after the receipt of the 
grant (Autio and Ranniko, 2016; Soderblom et al., 2015). 
 Increase companies' innovation capacities. The evidence from policy 
evaluations shows that between 29-61% of beneficiary firms were engaged in 
product or service innovation after receiving the grant. Econometric studies provide 
robust evidence of the positive effect on firm innovation measured by patent 
applications. 
 The effects for R&D grants for young innovative firms are larger than the 
effects of both generic R&D grants and R&D subsidies. For generic R&D grants, 
the effects are higher when the grants induce changes in firm behaviour and when 
they target particular technologies or sectors. 
Policy implications 
 R&D grants stimulate and prepare the companies for the growth phase. 
 Targeted funding (technology focus) delivers better results for disruptive 
innovations, whereas generic grants for SMEs are better suited for knowledge 
diffusion as they mostly deliver new to the firm rather than new to the market 
results.  
 Selection mechanisms built on milestones or subsequent phases of funding are 
still rarely used although their effects are very positive. This calls for a greater 
use of this type of mechanisms. 
 The competitive and attractive R&D grants help companies to attract follow up 
funding (signalling effect especially for equity). 
 Financial measures coupled with complementary services (e.g. networking, 
advice) have a longer lasting effect. 
 Tax incentives and grants are complementary as regards to their impact on 
firm's growth and innovation activities given the evidence of higher impact of 
combined application (tax incentives and grants).  
Related and future JRC work 
Our future research suggestion is to further investigate the impact of national R&D 
grants. In particular, a meta-regression analysis would help gaining further insight into 
the magnitude of the effects of R&D grants. It would be also interesting to analyse if 
national R&I policies have a lasting effect on firm behaviour (e.g. increase of R&D 
personnel; setting up of R&D collaborative agreements). 
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1 Introduction 
High growth innovative enterprise (HGIE) (1) are in the center of attention of policy 
makers in the recent years in response to the evidence of their positive impact on job 
creation and productivity growth in the economy (see Henrekson and Johansson, 2010, 
among others). They also contribute to knowledge diffusion by creating and 
implementing new technologies and products as well as by interacting with other firms 
(see Audretsch, 2005). Nevertheless, these companies experience difficulties in 
accessing finance when investing in their innovation activities.  
Notably, scholars such as Hall (2009), Hall and Lerner (2010) have suggested several 
rationales for supporting innovative firms with growth potential. First, it is very likely 
that small, young and potentially high-risk firms are excluded from bank loans due to 
lack of collateral. In particular, to scale up those firms need to invest in R&D activities, 
which are rarely collateralised. In most cases, there are information asymmetries 
between innovative firms aspiring to be high-growth firms and external financiers given 
that R&D investments are characterised by highly uncertain returns and costly 
monitoring. This is especially true for potential entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs without a 
well-established reputation. Furthermore, although some firms might be able to finance 
their profitable projects internally, the presence of R&D spillovers may force them to 
reduce their R&D expenses. That is, since the firms making these investments are 
unlikely to capture the entire surplus (e.g. the profits associated to new innovations may 
accrue to competitors who rapidly introduce imitations), they will tend to invest below 
the social optimal level of R&D. Based on these arguments, governments regularly 
support innovative firms with growth potential in their knowledge development and 
diffusion, but little is known about the effects of government R&D funding for such 
companies. 
The aim of this report (2) is to expand the existing knowledge on the effects of 
government-R&D funding by thoroughly reviewing the literature on R&D programmes 
and policy evaluations, with primary attention to young innovative firms with growth 
potential. More precisely, with recourse to the most relevant and recent literature (both 
academic and policy-oriented), this report investigates the impact of R&D grants 
targeting young innovative firms with growth potential and assesses their impact based 
on three indicators of HGIE performance – employment, turnover and innovation. 
After a brief discussion of the conceptual background of this study, Section 2 considers 
the rationale for this report and presents the research questions. Section 3 provides a 
discussion of our methodological approach and Section 4 presents and elaborates on the 
results of academic literature and policy evaluations. Section 5 presents the results 
distinguishing between generic R&D grants and R&D subsidies and compares them to the 
evidence for R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth potential. Section 6 
provides evidence of the effects of R&D grants specifically targeting young innovative 
firms with growth potential vis-a-vis tax incentives. Section 7 draws lessons from both 
policy evaluations and econometric studies. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
are presented in sections 8 and 9, respectively. 
 
                                          
1 The term ‘high-growth innovative firms’ is problematic when applied to something that may well be far from 
united or static. Yet, through lack of a better term, we refer to the ‘innovative firms with growth potential’ 
here to depict what we hope to show is a heterogeneous, transient and dynamic - and yet recognisable - 
presence of innovative firms aspiring for high-growth. 
2 This report is part of a larger project exploring modalities for access to finance for high growth innovative 
enterprises and scale-up companies carried out jointly by the JRC's Unit for Finance, Innovation and 
Growth, and the Units for Territorial Development and Digital Economy. The results of this report will 
complement the results from the first JRC study by Gampfer et al. (2016) on HGIE policies, and the study 
by Szkuta et al. (2018) which evaluates the impact of public equity on innovative firms with growth 
potential. The first report focuses on all publicly-funded instruments that are available in the policy mix to 
nurture the emergence of the high growth innovative companies, the second report focuses on public 
equity, while this report focuses on publicly-supported R&D grant programmes. 
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2 A gap in the existing high-growth firm literature 
High-growth firms are increasingly a target for government interventions (European 
Commission, 2010). This is especially true for Europe which is lagging behind the US in 
the number of fast growing highly innovative enterprises (the so-called scale-ups) (see 
Holzl and Janger, 2013). In Europe, the policy debate has been centred on a re-think of 
the innovation policy and a shift toward breakthrough and market-creating innovation. 
The tendency has been to focus on new sources and forms of R&I funding to enhance EU 
level support for young innovative companies with growth potential (3).  
 
Policies targeting high-growth innovative firms have been the subject of debate and re-
examination. Coad et al. (2014) provide a useful review of the literature and policy in 
this domain suggesting that the policies should be oriented to the identification of 
barriers to firm growth dynamics (one being the access to finance), rather than on the 
high-growth innovative firms themselves. Bos and Stam (2014) corroborate this 
argument suggesting that a focus on "Removing the barriers to growth of new firms in 
industries of their own choice, i.e. horizontal industrial policy, is a no-regret policy that is 
likely to enhance job creation in general" (Ibid: 165). Indeed, high-growth firms' policies 
are increasingly perceived as a way to stimulate future economic development. Yet, as 
Huber et al. (2014) argue, rather than increasing entry rates (i.e. share of companies 
entering an industry), high-growth innovative policies should aim at expanding start-up 
firm size in order to increase the share of high-growth firms. 
 
From a policy perspective, indeed, it is difficult to target high-growth innovative firms 
directly because of difficulties in establishing the target beneficiaries ex-ante (see 
Storey, 1994; Holzl, 2009; among others) as growth can be only measured ex post and 
their growth pattern is highly non-linear. The OECD defines a high-growth enterprise as 
one with “average annualised growth in turnover or employees greater than 20% a year, 
over a three-year period, and with ten or more employees at the beginning of the 
observation period” (Eurostat-OECD, 2007).  
The aim of this policy paper is to examine the effectiveness of R&D grants on the output 
of young innovative firms with growth potential, i.e. those companies that have the 
potential to experience high growth. Most of the existing literature on financial 
constraints mostly does not consider high-growth innovative firms explicitly and 
concentrates on financial constraints faced by small and medium firms (SMEs). We 
believe that a better understanding of the impact of national R&D programmes aimed at 
young innovative enterprises with high growth potential is important to improve our 
understanding of the consequences of such policies and to design better policies.  
2.1 Research Context 
There is a vast theoretical literature exploring the factors behind the financial constraints 
faced by innovative firms in financing their R&D activities. Scholars have focused mainly 
on two key factors: information asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970), and moral hazard 
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The basic theoretical framework is that of Akerlof 
(1970) that models the firm choice of accessing external finance, assuming that firms 
have better information about the returns on their R&D investment than potential 
investors. He suggests that entrepreneurs need to compensate their investors with a 
higher rate of return upon their R&I investment (which constitute the so-called lemon's 
premium (4) ) as they are not able to distinguish between bad and good R&I projects. He 
also predicts the disappearance of the market for R&D projects when the asymmetric 
problem becomes substantial. An alternative explanation for the existence of financial 
                                          
3 See, for instance, the SME Instrument of Horizon 2020 modelled after the US SBIR programme and other 
recent initiatives that try to alleviate the financial constraints of these companies through the supply of 
venture capital, such as a pan-European venture capital fund of funds within the Start-up and Scale up 
Initiative. 
4 Akerlof, G. (1970) 
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constraints is suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In their model, managers play 
a key role in firms' R&D investment decisions. They may under- or overinvest in R&D 
spending for two main reasons: first, managers' incentives may be involved in the firm 
value maximisation problem (5). In doing so, managers may deviate from their goal of 
shareholder value maximisation. Secondly, managers may avoid risky innovation 
projects because their remuneration may be linked to the success of their R&D projects. 
According to Hall (2009), it is the combination of asymmetric-information and agency 
costs that makes it difficult for innovative firms, especially start-ups, to decide whether 
or not to invest in innovative activities.  
In what follows, we investigate the extent to which innovative firms are financially 
constrained. An extensive body of empirical literature analyses whether innovative firms 
are affected by the presence of "liquidity constraints". Using data from the UK, Canepa 
and Stoneman (2008) point out that high-technology firms and smaller firms are more 
likely to encounter financial constraints than their counterparts. This is confirmed by 
Magri (2009) indicating that cash-flow sensitivity is higher among small innovative firms 
in Italy. With reference to German firms, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009) find that more 
leveraged firms innovate less when they are strongly controlled by managers. Drawing 
on US data, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) find that small owner-managed firms in 
R&D intensive environments suffer most from financing constraints. More importantly, 
they show that being a member of a business group or being a main shareholder of a 
large corporation may provide collateral for a small firm's investment. 
There are few studies investigating the relevance of patents for the external financing of 
innovative and young entrepreneurs. Audretsch et al. (2012) suggest that a nascent 
entrepreneur that possesses patents as well as prototypes has a higher probability of 
obtaining equity finance from business angels and venture capitalists. However, the 
authors emphasize that the signalling force of patent matters to investors only if the 
nascent entrepreneurs are in the early stage of the start-up process rather than in the 
planning stage. Scholars such as Bottazzi et al. (2008) and Hall (2009) have argued that 
specialised financial intermediaries, such as venture capital organisations, can address 
credit market imperfections by scrutinizing firms ex-ante and engaging in ex-post 
monitoring. In particular, Hall (2009) argues that specialised venture capitalists supply 
informed monitoring of early stage technology start-ups and perform coaching (including 
monitoring, support, and control) and scout functions which contribute to their 
development. 
Finally, Hallak et al. (2017) find that young companies are more financially constrained 
than mature ones. When focusing on financially constrained start-up and young 
companies, the authors find that they are nearly 25% less likely to be high-growth 
companies than other start-ups. 
There is a general tendency to associate young innovative companies with growth 
potential with venture capital supply. Yet, when looking at the full 'funding escalator' 
(Nesta, 2009) those companies make use of different public and private sources of 
finance. There is a need to look at the wide spectrum of instruments that support the 
emergence and scale up of those companies and this reports looks more closely at use of 
grants aimed at growth and export. 
R&D grants are a source of upfront finance (as opposed to tax incentives) do not involve 
partial loss of control as in case of equity and are potentially more available than a bank 
loan given the lack of a tangible collateral and the presence of information asymmetries.  
                                          
5 In the literature, economists have used the usual tools of profit maximization to model the firm decision as a 
choice made by firm owners and shareholders who decide to invest in R&D if the return from R&D 
investment is higher than the cost of R&D capital. Their decision, however, may be distorted by managers 
who want to maximize their own benefits. 
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2.2 Research Rationale, Aims and Questions 
As noted in Cunningham et al. (2013) the R&D grant support for SMEs has become 
increasingly targeted at specific sectors (high and medium technology) and types of 
SMEs – young companies, start-ups, scale-ups, therefore anticipating specific needs of 
those beneficiaries.  
In our study the R&D programmes are classified into three main categories: R&D grants 
for young innovative enterprises with growth potential; R&D grants targeted at all firms 
and all sectors (we use the term generic R&D grants from now on) and R&D subsidies.  
a) R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth potential: are grants for 
market expansion, internationalisation, i.e. specifically targeting growth; R&D grants for 
(innovative) SMEs or young innovative companies with growth potential financing part or 
the totality of the research project costs to bring it to the market. Our strategy for the 
identification of such grants is that the firm growth potential status be included in the 
eligibility criteria and in the scope of R&D programme. Most of such R&D grants are 
awarded on a competitive basis and are covering future R&D costs of a specific project 
and/or costs of proof of concept and or market and prototyping. These grants may be 
delivered with additional services – coaching, advice, and training. 
b) Generic R&D grants: are R&D grants targeted at all firms/all SMEs in all sectors;  
c) R&D subsidies: refer not only to R&D grants, but also encompasses other R&D 
measures such as subsidized loans, and R&D tax incentives. 
Most of empirical works focuses on the effects of generic R&D grants and R&D subsidies, 
with limited research on the effects of R&D grants for high-growth potential young 
innovative firms. We use the effects of both generic R&D grants and R&D subsidies as a 
benchmark for comparison relative to the effects of R&D grants for young innovative 
firms with growth potential. To complement this picture, we also use the evidence 
regarding the impact of R&D grants versus tax incentives.  
 
Research Questions 
The aim of this study and its rationale is thus to provide a more rigorous impact 
evaluation of R&D policies targeting young innovative firms with growth 
potential through an examination of existing policy evaluations and academic 
literature. This study examines specific R&D grants for young innovative firms with 
growth potential as well as generic R&D grants, and R&D subsidies including various 
types of financial products such as subsidized loans, and R&D tax incentives. The specific 
research questions we attempt at tackling are: what are the effects of R&D grants on 
employment, firm economic and innovative performance, and innovation when the 
objective of R&D programmes is to help innovative firms grow faster? And, how do these 
R&D grants that specifically target young innovative firms with growth potential compare 
in term of employment, firm economic and innovative performance, and innovative 
activities with generic R&D grants and R&D subsidies commonly used as external funding 
to support both SMEs and large enterprises?  
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3 Methodological Framework 
 
3.1 Research Design 
Our research approach is based on two different sources of information: policy 
evaluation studies (using mostly a qualitative approach), and academic literature (using 
mostly econometric methods). In policy evaluation studies, the main methods are online 
surveys, project administrative data analysis and qualitative interviews with beneficiaries 
and other actors assessing the impact of the grant of firm's outputs. In academic 
literature, the outcomes of policies are tested using different econometric techniques 
such as ordinary least squares regression analysis (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) 
analysis. We use both policy evaluation reports and academic contributions to identify 
the types of R&D grants studied and assess their impact on output additionality (e.g. in 
terms of revenue, employment growth, patenting activity and innovative sales).  
 
3.2 Research Method 
(a) Identification of R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth potential, 
selection criteria 
Our research approach focuses on R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth 
potential and their effects using available results from both policy evaluation studies and 
econometric studies.  
Policy evaluation studies were explored through contacts with national experts in each 
country, and the use of the SIPER database. The academic articles on government-
funded R&D programmes targeting innovative firms with growth potential were found 
through the Scopus and Science direct databases between March and September 2017. 
Keywords in the search included "R&D" "grants", "subsidies", "support", "SMEs", 
"young", "innovative firms", "high-growth firms", "young innovative firms", and "growth 
potential". Our research identified more than 200 academic articles. Titles and abstracts 
of these studies were screened. We focus on direct grants for R&I projects only if their 
objective is to help innovative firms grow faster. Moreover, we only included studies 
where the median firm age is under 10 years old (6). The application of this inclusion 
criteria resulted in a short list of 48 econometric studies. Several papers were excluded 
because the programme targeted larger firms or SMEs in general. Another group of 
papers were excluded because they evaluated mixed programmes where no isolated 
effect of R&D grants only was assessed. This resulted in a final list of 13 econometric 
papers.  
Table 1A in the Annex 2 list all the policy evaluation studies used, while Table 1B in the 
same Annex provides a representative list of the most relevant econometric studies 
carried out since 2000. Both tables show the authorship, the country in which the study 
was performed, the name of the policy initiative, the agency funding, the aim of the 
programme evaluated, the eligibility criteria and the selection process and method.  
Thus, in our analysis, the target group of high-growth innovative firms comprises young 
innovative SMEs i.e. SMEs mostly active in highly innovative sectors (such as aerospace, 
agricultural technologies, and automotive) and technologies (big data, satellites, and 
robotics) that are seen as important future economic sectors. We further focus our 
attention on those R&D programmes for young innovative firms with growth potential, 
whose main purpose is to facilitate access to finance.  
                                          
(6)  As a universal definition of young innovative firms with growth potential does not exist, we use an upper 
cut-off of 10 years old. The descriptive statistics in Table 1A in the Annex 1 show that beneficiary firms are 
not older than 10 years (median age) and are firms with less than 49 employees (median size).  
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In order to gauge the effectiveness of each HGIE policy measure, we analyse the policy 
evaluation studies along the "output additionality" dimension, rather than the "input" or 
"behavioural additionality" (7). The "output additionality" approach addresses the effects 
of policies on the output of firms, as measured by innovation activities, employment 
growth and firm performance (in terms of output, sales –including sales of new products 
and foreign sales/exports - value added and revenues).  
 
(b) Identification of generic R&D grants and R&D subsidies, selection criteria 
The study compares R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth potential to both 
generic R&D grants and R&D subsidies. We screened the academic literature related to 
R&D using the Scopus and Science direct databases between March and September 
2017. The examples of key search terms are "R&D", "programmes", "subsidies", and 
"grant". We have studied the effects of both generic R&D grants and mixed R&D 
programmes: 
 Generic R&D grants being R&D programmes grants targeting all companies, i.e. 
both SMEs and larger enterprises.  
 R&D subsidies are all R&D programmes (grants, loans and tax incentives). Those 
studies do not distinguish between instruments when reporting effects.   
Our search resulted in more than 500 studies in the first sample.  
Subsequently the titles and abstracts of these studies were screened. Whenever the 
paper adhered to above mentioned criteria having the scope on output additionality, it 
was included. We also paid attention to the research design and the econometric 
methods used in these studies; in particular, we looked at the validity, reliability, and the 
interpretative and representational 'power' of these studies. We included studies that 
used regression analysis, instrumental variables methods as well as quasi-experimental 
designs. 
 
3.3 Research Limitations 
We are fully aware that the term "high-growth innovative firms" is problematic so we 
refer to the group of "high-growth innovative firms" in this report to depict a 
heterogeneous, dynamic and yet recognisable group of young innovative companies with 
a growth potential. A number of policy evaluations and academic studies identify what 
constitute young innovative companies based on parameters such as age criteria, and 
minimum level of R&D intensity (8). The analysis in this report presents the 
heterogeneity of policy options applied in Member States.  
Another limitation of the analysis is the use of different output indicators which make it 
difficult to compare the impact of policy measure.  
Finally, limitations still remain in identifying the impact of R&D grant on firm's output. 
Most of evaluations do not control for multiple simultaneous treatment effects, i.e. firms 
receiving funding from different sources (e.g. tax credits combined with grants)(9). 
Therefore the attribution of causality is problematic. 
                                          
7 See Table 4A in the Annex 4 for a brief discussion of the project additionality. The evidence comes from the 
policy evaluations. Unfortunately, the issue has not been investigated in the selected econometric studies. 
8 See Czarnitzki and Delanote (2012) for an in-depth discussion of young innovative companies. 
9 See Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) for an overview of the issue of 'hidden treatment'. 
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4 Results 
We reviewed seven policy evaluations and 13 econometric analyses of R&D grant impact 
on young innovative firms with growth potential. The vast majority of studies use data 
from the EU (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy and UK) and 
other developed countries (Norway and US). One empirical study uses data from China. 
Also, most of the econometric studies use longitudinal data and the predominant 
estimation method is the two-stage regression approach, with a selection equation and 
an outcome equation.  
The results from our review of the literature are reported according to three main 
outcome variables:  
i) employment in terms of the (change in) number of employees or hours 
worked within the supported innovative firms with growth potential;  
ii) firm performance & productivity (where firm performance is mainly 
measured in terms of output, sales (including sales of new products), value 
added, revenues; whereas productivity is measured as labour productivity or 
Total Factor Productivity, TFP); and  
iii) innovation measured in terms of product and/or process innovation as well 
as in terms of patent application.  
The sample of studies has been constructed according to the type of output additionality 
analysed. Table 1 summarises the evidence on the effects of R&D grants targeting young 
innovative firms with growth potential on the variables of interest.  
A half of the selected studies (11) find that R&D grants are related to increases in 
employment among innovative enterprises with growth potential. More than half of the 
studies (14 over 20) find that R&D grants increase economic and innovation performance 
of innovative enterprises with growth potential, and 35% of the empirical studies (7) find 
that such R&D grants foster firm engagement in innovation processes. 
 
Table 1. Evidence sources 
 All 
sources 
Academic 
articles 
Policy 
evaluation 
reports 
Employment 11 5 6 
Economic and Innovation performance 14 8 6 
Innovation 7 3 4 
Total 20 13 7 
 
In the next subsection we discuss the results from these studies distinguishing among 
three important outcomes: 1) impact on firm employment, 2) firm economic and 
innovative performance, and 3) firm innovative activities.  
 
4.1 Impact on firm employment 
4.1.1 Policy evaluations 
The evaluation of the Spanish Centre for the Development of Industrial Technology 
(CDTI, 2015) finds that 40% of R&I projects subsidised in 2014 generated new 
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jobs. In Ireland, the "Impact assessment of Enterprise Ireland Propel Programme" 
(Forfas, 2012) finds that almost 1/5 (18%) of surveyed beneficiaries experienced 
employment growth which can be attributed to the participation in the programme, 
whereas over two-thirds (68%) expected employment growth over the next 12 
months. When managers in the "Evolve" initiative for creative industries implemented 
over the period 2008-2013 in Austria were interviewed, they reported increases in the 
number of employees in 36% of the funded projects (Radauer and Dudenbostel, 
2014). Thirty four percent of surveyed beneficiaries of the Finnish Young Innovative 
Companies Programme (NIY Programme) reported increased employment by more 
than 100% since their initial engagement in the NIY Programme. Results from the 
Academia plus Business (AplusB) grants study conducted with a longer time frame 
showed that nine years after admission to the AplusB Center, the surviving AplusB 
cases have almost twice as many employees as the surviving companies of the 
control group. The descriptive statistics of the survival rates show a substantial 
dissimilarity between the AplusB group and control group data. The AplusB group report 
a higher survival rate compared to the control group (87% and 59% respectively) 
(Ploder et al., 2015). For the SMART scheme (10) in UK, the SQW report (2015) show 
that about 55% of the SMART-awarded firms have experienced a positive 
employment change as a result of the Smart award, and 85% of them will expect 
to see a positive employment change in the future. When looking at the impact of the 
SMART scheme on employment among different type of beneficiaries (Proof of Market 
beneficiaries, Proof of Concept beneficiaries, and Development of Prototype 
beneficiaries), the Proof of Market beneficiaries report a higher change in employment as 
a result of the Smart project, compared to other beneficiaries (both Proof of Concept, 
and Proof of Development of Prototype beneficiaries). This finding is not surprising given 
their higher risk, and thus, their higher R&D reward opportunities.  
 
Table 2. Effects of R&D grants on firm employment: Evidence from policy evaluations 
Study Country Policy initiative Data Period Method 
% of firms 
reporting 
increases in 
employment 
CDTI (2015) ES CDTI projects 
1061 
projects 
2012-
2014 
Survey 40% 
Forfas (2012) IE 
Enterprise Ireland 
Propel 
Programme 
25 firms 
2009-
2010 
Survey 
18% (a higher 
percentage of 
firms, 68%, 
reported 
increases in 
employment at 
t+1) 
Radauer and 
Dudenbostel 
(2014) 
AT 
The Initiative for 
the Creative 
Industries 
"evolve" 
77 firms 
2008-
2013 
Interviews 
and online 
surveys 
36% 
The Evidence 
Network (2013) 
FI 
The NIY 
Programme 
108 
companie
s 
2013 
Web-based 
survey 
34% of firms 
reported an 
increase in 
employment 
greater than 
100% 
                                          
10 The Smart scheme supports R&D activity at three different stages: Proof of Market grants, Proof of concept 
grants, and Development of Prototype grants. Innovate UK, the UK's innovation agency, appointed SQW 
Ltd, working with Cambridge Econometrics and BMG Research, to undertake an evaluation of SMART 
scheme in 2014. 
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Ploder et al. 
(2015) 
AT 
APlusB 
programme 
_ 
2007-
2014 
Interviews 
and data 
analysis 
with 
control 
group 
compariso
n 
The number of 
employees in 
granted firms is 
more than twice 
that of employees 
in non-granted 
firms as a result 
of the APlusB 
programme 
 
 
 
SQW (2015) 
UK SMART scheme 
513 
SMEs 
2012-
2013 
Survey 
55% of the 
SMART awarded 
firms have 
experienced a 
positive change in 
employment, and 
85% of them will 
expect in the 
future 
 
4.1.2 Academic studies 
The findings from policy evaluations are consistent with articles based on econometric 
methods (11). Girma et al. (2010) investigated the impact of grants for start-ups using 
traditional OLS analysis. Regression results indicate that a supported plant employs 
on average 1.21 employees more after the grant than a non-supported plant. In 
addition, using quantile regressions, the authors found that the effects of grants appear 
to be stronger for plants at the medium to high-end of the size distribution (between the 
50th and 75th quantiles) than for plants at the very low or high ends. The results are 
confirmed when using a matching procedure to deal with the issue of selection bias in 
grant receipt.  
A study by Koski and Pajarinen (2011) using firm level data from Finland show that R&D 
subsidies have a significant and positive effect on contemporaneous employment 
growth among both older incumbents (i.e. all firms that are over five years old at a 
given year) and start-ups (i.e. firms that are up to five years old), while it does not seem 
to have much effect on the employment growth of gazelles (i.e. 10% fastest growing 
firms among start-ups). For those firms, both the presence of possible lagged effects of 
R&D subsidies and other forms of financing (e.g. equity) may play a larger role in 
explaining variation in employment among young innovative firms with growth potential.  
Using panel data analysis (i.e FE-IV estimator) for Italy between 1994 and 2003, 
Colombo et al. (2013) find evidence of R&D grants positively influencing employment 
growth of young (i.e. firms that are 5 years old or younger at the time of receipt of the 
grant) new technology-based firms (NTBFs) during the two year period following the 
receipt of R&D grants. In contrast, no effect is found for mature NTBFs.  
Soderblom et al. (2015) study VINN NU grant effects in Sweden and find that firms 
awarded the grant also attract more employees. The OLS estimated coefficient indicates 
that granted firms on average hire about 14 employees more than non-granted 
firms. The authors conclude that the award of a VINN NU subsidy acts as a signal 
increasing firm probability to attract personnel.  
Einio (2014), using data on government R&D funding in Finland, find that on average 
granted firms employ on average 2.33 employees more after the grant than 
non-granted firms , controlling for other factors. 
  
                                          
11 See Annex 4 for a discussion of the interpretation of the coefficients.  
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Table 3. Effects of R&D grants on firm employment: Evidence from academic studies 
Study Country Data Period Method Main finding 
Girma et al. (2010) Ireland 4853 plants 
1972-
2000 
OLS and 
Quantile 
regression 
1.21 more than non-
recipient start-ups 
Koski and Pajarinen 
(2011) 
Finland 
_  
Start-ups, 
gazelles, 
and 
incumbents 
2003-
2008 
Two-stage least 
squares 
random effects 
model and the 
differences-in 
difference 
method 
Positive effect of 
R&D grants on start-
ups and incumbents' 
employment growth 
Colombo et al. (2013) Italy 
536 New 
technology-
based firms 
1994-
2003 
GMM-IVFE 
Positive effect of 
R&D grants on 
young NTBFs 
employment growth 
Soderblom et al. (2015) Sweden 1102 firms 
2002-
2008 
OLS regression 
Awarded firms 
attract 14 
employees more 
than non-awarded 
firms 
Einio (2014) Finland 1800 firms 
2000-
2005 
Fixed Effect 
panel data 
model, and IV 
estimation 
Positive and large 
effect on 
employment. 2.3 
more than non-
granted firms 
 
4.2 Impact on firms' economic and innovative performance 
This section explores the relationship between R&D grants and firms' economic and 
innovative performance. In the evaluations the beneficiary firms were asked to report 
whether they have experienced sales growth or sales growth from innovative products as 
a result of their participation in the programme, and provide a quantification of this 
growth. 
4.2.1 Policy evaluations 
The results of the evaluation of the CDTI grants (2015) in Spain shows that in 92% of 
firms the subsidised projects generated high turnover, but only 13.5% of total 
sales comes from sales of innovative products. The study suggests that it may be due to 
the adverse market conditions which may have negatively affected R&D 
commercialisation strategy. In Ireland, a study by Forfas (2012) finds that 41% of 
surveyed beneficiaries had already experienced sales growth as a result of 
granted public support granted, while a further 54% sales growth was expected over the 
next twelve months. When considering the Austrian "Evolve" initiative for the Creative 
Industries, Radauer and Dubenbostel (2014) find that about 30% of the projects 
reported increases in sales. In Finland, 61% of firms saw an increase of 100% or 
more in their annual revenues since their first engagement in the NIY Programme. In 
Denmark, IRIS Group has carried out a survey questionnaire among 122 firms over the 
period 2010-mid-2014. Firms were asked to assess the contribution of the Market 
Development Fund in increasing the commercial potential of their product (i.e. market 
expansion). About 58% of the respondents reported increased market 
penetration. For the SMART scheme in UK, a report by SQW (2015) show that 33% of 
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beneficiary firms have experienced a change in sale in the current year, and 
88% of them expect to experience a change in sales in the future as a result of the 
SMART-awarded project. When considering the composition of beneficiaries in term of 
type of grant, a higher percentage of beneficiaries of Development of Prototype award as 
compared to beneficiaries of Proof of Market reports a change in turnover in the current 
year (48% vs 24%), but the proportion of beneficiaries of Development of Prototype 
award expecting a change in turnover in the future is also higher (93% vs 79%). Thus, 
most of the sales effects of SMART awards over 2012 and 2013 remain to be realised. 
The SMART report also shows that 74% of SMART beneficiaries expect to increase 
their export activity as a result of the award; this reflects the R&D knowledge based 
nature of these firms. 
 
Table 4. Effect of R&D grants on firm economic and innovative performance: Evidence from policy 
evaluations 
Study Country Policy initiative Data Period Method 
Increase in 
sales 
CDTI (2015) ES CDTI projects 
1061 
projects 
2012-
2014 
Survey 92% 
Forfas (2012) IE Propel Programme 25 firms 
2009-
2010 
Survey 41% 
Radauer and 
Dubenbostel 
(2014) 
AT 
The Initiative for the 
Creative Industries 
"evolve” 
77 firms 
2008-
2013 
Interviews 
and online 
surveys 
30% 
The Evidence 
Network 
(2013) 
FI The NIY Programme 
108 
companie
s 
2013 
Web-based 
survey 
61% 
IRIS group 
(2015) 
DK Market Maturation 
Fund 
122 firms 2010-
2012 
Survey 58% 
SQW (2015) UK SMART scheme 482 SMEs 
2012-
2013 
Survey and 
difference-
in-
difference 
analysis 
33% 
 
4.2.2 Academic studies 
Guo et al. (2016) investigate the effect of the Chinese Innofund programme on 
innovation outputs (measured by sales from new products, exports, and newly granted 
patents) in a panel data analysis between 1998 and 2007. The results show that the 
R&D support significantly increases the sales from new products (by 7.88%) and 
the firms' exports volumes (by 2.41%). Likewise, when looking at the impact of the 
amount of funding, the estimated coefficients are statistically significant and positive 
suggesting that firms that receive a larger Innofund grant generate higher sales from 
new products and exports. This finding is not surprising; however it conveys the idea 
that the amount of money was considered by firms adequate and appropriate. Even after 
controlling for endogeneity of participation in Innofund, the study finds that the firms 
generate more sales from new products after the grant.  
Autio and Rannikko (2016) investigate the effects of the NIY programme in Finland on 
sales growth by measured by the log difference of sales between the year before the 
firm applied to the NIY programme and the total realised sales during the three 
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subsequent years. As a result the initiative positively influence sales growth of high-
growth firms. In particular, the authors find that within the time span of two years, the 
difference-in-difference point estimate in growth sales between NIY participants and the 
control group is 1.20 and 1.30 over a three-year period, implying that the NIY 
programme has more than doubled the growth rate of treated firms. 
Furthermore, they find that the growth enhancing impact is mainly due to the 
contribution made by the NIY programme itself, and not because of the selection effects 
(i.e. there is no difference in pre-treatment growth between treated and untreated 
groups).  
Grilli and Murtinu (2012), using data on Italian new-technology based firms (NTBFs), 
provide empirical evidence on the effects that R&D subsidies have on firm total factor 
productivity growth (distinguishing between R&D grants and other subsidies - mainly 
fiscal contributions). The authors find that only R&D policy schemes contribute to TFP 
growth. In particular, they find that TFP increases by 25 per cent more than other 
R&D schemes when Italian NTBFs receive R&D grants on a competitive basis.  
Gans and Stern (2003) find that highest performing Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) funded projects in US are active in industries with high rates of venture capital 
funding. The size elasticity is 0.653, implying a 0.65 percent increase in revenue for one 
percent increase in venture capital funding.  
Einio (2014) provides evidence on the influence of R&D support programmes on firm 
sales' growth in Finland and investigate the extent to which government funding varies 
across regions. Using data on firm applicants to Tekes during the period 2000 and 2006, 
the author finds that granted firms report higher sales' growth than non-granted 
firms. When controlling for population density, the coefficient of R&D grants becomes 
larger indicating that firms located in regions where there are high levels of regional R&D 
support report higher sales' growth.  
A study from Soderblom et al. (2015) use VINN NU grants data from Sweden to show 
that on average receiving the grant increases firm sales by 11 percent more 
without the grant. Similar result is found by Howell (2015) and Gicheva et al. (2016). 
Howell (2015), using data on the Department of Energy's SBIR in the US finds that 
Phase 1 SBIR increase the firms’ probability of commercialisation by 11 
percentage points on average. Gicheva et al. (2016) report that a further increase 
in SBIR funding lead to an increase by 18 percent firm’s probability of 
technology commercialisation.  
 
Table 5. Effect of R&D grants on firm economic and innovative performance: Evidence from 
academic studies 
Study Country Policy 
initiative 
Data Period Method Main finding 
Guo et al. 
(2016)  
China Innofund 
Programme  
2638  
firms 
1999-
2007 
Fixed Effect 
panel data 
model, logit 
regression 
and IV 
estimation 
Innofund support increases 
sales from new products by 
7.88% and export volume 
by 2.41%  
Autio and 
Rannikko 
(2016)  
Finland NIY 
Programme  
160 new 
technolo
gy based 
firms 
with 
growth 
orientatio
n 
2008-
2012 
Matching 
estimator 
The NIY programmehas 
more than doubled the 
growth rate of treated 
firms. 
17 
 
Grilli and 
Murtinu 
(2012) 
Italy R&D 
schemes 
247 new 
technolo
gy based 
firms 
1994-
2003 
GMM 
estimator 
The impact of R&D grants 
on the TFP growth of NTBFs 
of positive and of 
considerable economic 
magnitude (i.e. 25%) 
Soderblom 
et al. 
(2015)  
Sweden The 
Programme 
VINN NU 
(Win Now)  
1102 
firms  
2002-
2008 
OLS 
estimations 
VINN Nu subsidy is 
positively and significantly 
relate to performance (the 
estimated coefficient is 
0.112) 
Gans and 
Stern 
(2003) 
US SBIR 
Programme 
71 small 
firms (36 
employee
s on 
average) 
1990-
1998 
OLS 
regressions 
Positive and significant 
effect of SBIR Programme. 
The highest performing 
SBIR-funded projects tend 
to be related with those 
industrial segments with 
high rates of venture 
capital funding 
Einio 
(2014) 
Finland R&D projects 1800 
firms 
2000-
2005 
Fixed Effect 
panel data 
model, and 
IV 
estimation 
Positive and significant 
effects of R&D support 
Programme on sales (the 
IV estimate of the 
treatment effect on sales is 
very large, i.e. 0.912)  
Howell 
(2015) 
US SBIR 
Programme 
7436 
high-tech 
firms 
1983-
2013 
OLS; 
negative 
binomial 
A phase 1 grant increases a 
firm's probability of 
commercialization by 11 
percentage points 
Gicheva 
and Link 
(2016) 
US SBIR 
Programme 
1878 
firms 
2005 Two-stage 
selection 
probit model 
The probability of 
commercialization is nearly 
18% points higher for 
granted firms. 
 
4.3 Impact on firms' innovative activities 
This section examines the relationship between R&D grants and firms' innovative 
activities. In the available evidence, firms were asked to report whether they have been 
engaged in product/service innovation as a result of their participation in the R&D 
programme. Innovative activities are measured by innovation dummy variables (12), and 
patents.  
4.3.1 Policy evaluations 
In Ireland, a Forfas (2012) evaluation study on "Propel Programme" finds that 29% of 
companies had engaged in new product development as a result of support provided 
with a further 61% expecting to develop and introduce a new product or service over the 
next twelve months. In Austria, Radauer and Dudenbostel (2014) find that 61% of 
projects funded by "Evolve" have led to new or substantially improved products. 
As observed by SQW (2015), Smart scheme was undoubtedly fundamental in the 
development of new or improved products or services. According to the report SQW 
(2015), a higher percentage of Development of Prototype beneficiaries as compared to 
Proof of Market and Concept respondents report a new or significantly improved 
product/service to the market (41% vs 25% and 28%), but the proportion of Proof of 
                                          
12 According to the OSLO Manual (2005), innovation is defined as ‘…the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational 
method in business practises, workplace organisation or external relations’ (OECD, 2005: 46). 
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Market and Concept respondents stating that they expect to introduce new 
service/product in the future is higher (56% and 64% vs 53%). 
 
Table 6. Effect of R&D grants on firms' innovative activities: Evidence from policy evaluations 
Study Country 
Policy 
initiative 
Data Period Method 
Product 
innovation 
Forfas (2012) IE 
Propel 
Programme 
25 firms 
2009-
2010 
Survey 29% 
Radauer and 
Dudenbostel 
(2014) 
AT 
The Initiative 
for the 
Creative 
Industries 
"evolve" 
77 firms 
2008-
2013 
Interviews 
and online 
surveys 
61% 
IRIS group 
(2015) 
DK 
Market 
Maturation 
Fund 
122 projects 
2010-
2012 
Survey 58% 
SQW (2015) UK 
SMART 
scheme 
482 SMEs 
2012-
2013 
Survey and 
difference-
in-difference 
analysis 
41% of 
Development 
of Prototype 
beneficiaries 
have 
introduced a 
new 
product/service 
 
4.3.2 Academic studies 
Guo et al. (2016), using data for China, find that firms generate both more total patents 
and invention patents (13) after obtaining Innofund grants. The growth rate of newly 
granted patents of all types for Innofund-backed firms after the grant is 13.2% 
higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms. Additionally, the growth rate of newly 
granted invention patents for Innofund-backed firms after the grant is 8.6% higher 
than that of non-Innofund-backed firms. When using the amount of funding as an 
explanatory variable, the authors find that, after winning a funding of 1 million RMB, the 
growth of newly granted patents of all types generated by Innofund-backed firms is 20% 
higher than that of non-Innofund-backed firms. For the case of newly invention patents, 
a funding of 1 million RMB results in 10% higher growth for Innofund-backed firms 
compared with non-Innofund firms. These latter findings indicate that a 1 million RMB 
increase in Innofund support increases the probability of firms being innovative (at 20% 
for newly granted patents of all types, and at 10% for newly invention patents).  
Bronzini and Piselli (2016) examine the regional R&D grants effect on innovation in a 
group of technology-based firms in a northern region of Italy (Emilia-Romagna). When 
splitting the sample by firm size, they find that the impact of R&D grants is greater 
for smaller firms, i.e. small firms increase the number of patent applications by almost 
twice the mean application rate of small untreated firms, whereas large firms increase 
patent applications by around 1.2 times the mean for large untreated firms. This finding 
seems to support the arguments that small firms find it harder than large firms to 
                                          
13 In China there are three types of patents, namely, invention, utility, and design patents. Utility patents are 
generally granted to technical solutions related to shapes or structures, whereas design patents are 
normally granted to shapes and patterns with patentable aesthetic appeals. Invention patents are granted 
to the methods and products; they are the most technologically innovative and thus require more R&D 
efforts than the other types.  
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finance innovation activity due to more acute informational asymmetries and adverse 
selection problems (14). For the whole sample, they find that in relative terms the effect 
of treatment is about 1.4 times the average for untreated firms in terms of patent 
applications. 
Widmann (2016) finds that the research grant introduced by the Austrian Research 
Promotion Agency (FFG) increases the propensity to file a patent application with 
the European Patent Office within four years following the provision of a grant by 10.8 
percentage points (statistically significant at the 5% level) for subsidized firms. 
Furthermore, when splitting the sample by firm age (by less than five years and more 
than five years), he finds that this effect is stronger for established firms above the 
median age (five years). More precisely, results show that the effect of funding is 17 
percentage points for established firms (statistically significant at the 1% level) whereas 
it is 3.63 percentage points for younger firms (not statistically significant). Such finding 
may be explained by the higher participation of established firms in high-risk projects 
compared to young firms.  
 
Table 7. Effect of grants on firms' innovative activities: Evidence from academic studies 
Study Country 
Policy 
initiative 
Data Period Method Main finding 
Widmann 
(2016) 
AT 
Basis 
Programme
m 
1936 
firms 
2002-
2005 
IV variable 
approach 
Government research grant 
increases the propensity to 
file a patent application 
with the European Patent 
Office within 4 years by 10 
percentage points. 
Stronger effects for 
established firms. 
Guo et al. 
(2016) 
China 
Innofund 
Programme 
2638  
firms 
1999-
2007 
Fixed Effect 
panel data 
model, logit 
regression 
and IV 
estimation 
The growth rate of newly 
granted patents for 
Innofund-backed firms 
after the grant is 13.2% 
higher than that of non-
Innofund-backed firms. The 
growth rate of newly 
granted invention patents 
is 8.6% higher for 
Innofund-backed firms than 
that of non-Innofund-
backed firms. 
Bronzini 
and Piselli 
(2016) 
IT R&D grants 
1246 
high-tech 
firms 
2000-
2005 
Regression 
Discontinuity 
Design 
Positive effect of R&D 
grants on the number of 
patents (i.e. the effect of 
the treatment is about 1.4 
times the average for 
untreated firms). The effect 
is significantly greater for 
smaller firms (sales are 
below the median) than for 
larger enterprises. Positive 
effect of the Programme on 
firm's probability of 
applying for a patent, 
especially for smaller firms. 
 
                                          
14 Another possible reason for this finding (suggested by our reviewer) is that small firms with small-scale R&D 
projects may benefit more from R&D grants than larger firms with large-scale R&D projects. 
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5 A comparative analysis 
This section addresses the question: what are the effects of generic R&D grants on 
employment, firm economic and innovative performance, and innovation? What are the 
effects of R&D subsidies on the same set of outcome variables? And how do they 
compare with the effects of R&D grants for innovative firms with growth potential?  
Drawing on the large empirical body of literature relating R&D programmes and firm 
output, we classify the R&D programmes existing in the literature in two main categories 
different from R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth potential. 
a) Generic R&D grants: R&D grants for all firms –including SMEs- operating in all 
economic sectors 
b) R&D subsidies: R&D grants combined with other financial support such as subsidized 
loans, fiscal credit, and guarantees. 
In the next two sections (5.1 and 5.2) we present the results from the literature review, 
distinguishing between studies related to generic R&D grants and those related to R&D 
subsidies. In each section we discuss the effects of each type of R&D programmes and 
how they compare with those stemming from R&D grants for young innovative firms with 
growth potential. It is worth noting here that this section draws solely on the results 
from academic studies. 
5.1 Results: generic R&D grants 
5.1.1 Impact on firm employment 
How relevant are generic R&D grants to increase firm employment? The evidence is 
limited as only two studies investigate to which extent generic R&D grants stimulate 
employment (15).  
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) examine the effect of R&D grant schemes on firm 
R&D employment intensity (measured as the ratio of R&D employment to total 
employment) in Flanders. They find that there is a significant difference between the 
control group and the subsided group, which amount to 9.57% points, and that this 
effect does not change over time (from 2004 to 2008). When focusing on R&D grant 
schemes for SMEs (the KOM Programme (16)) they find that smaller firms benefit 
more in terms of R&D employment from R&D grant schemes than larger firms, 
i.e. this treatment effect is larger for SMEs (10.19%). When estimating the 
microeconomic impact of generic R&D grants, they find that on average the grant 
creates five additional R&D jobs (the projects are 2,012 in total).  
Bedu and Vanderstocken (2015) use regional data on R&D grants for SMEs (17) to show 
that the R&D employment growth rate in subsided firms is on average between 46.5% 
and 48.9%, compared to growth rates for non-subsidized firms ranging from 10.5% and 
18%. The non-R&D workforce in the subsidized firms increases between 73.1% and 
83.5%, a substantial rate of growth compared to their non-subsidized counterparts 
(between 5.6% and 23.4%).  
                                          
15 Given the lack of research on firm employment, in this section we move beyond the 'output additionality' to 
examine the "behavioural additionality". While the 'output additionality' provides the empirical evidence of 
the impact of R&D programmes on firm output, the behavioural additionality' examines "how" and "why" 
the participation in R&D projects has produced the desired effects.  
16 The "KMO programma" is a special program for SMEs. The maximum project cost a firm can submit under 
this program is €200,000. Of these total project costs, the maximum subsidy rate is of 35% for a medium-
sized company, and an extra 10% for a small-sized company. If an SME collaborates with a public 
research institute or an international partner, it can submit a proposal of a maximum of €250,000. If it 
collaborates with another firm (nationally), it can get 10% top-up in the subsidy rate. 
17 The main scope of the measure is to promote the development of firms, with a particular focus on SMEs. The 
main selection criteria of this measure are: the size of the firm, the content of R&D projects, and the 
collaborative dimension of the project. 
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In brief, the evidence collected on generic R&D grants shows that the effects of 
generic R&D grants on employment tend to be larger for SMEs than large firms 
(18). 
Given the scarcity of empirical studies, an important policy implication is the need for 
more rigorous evaluation of existing and new R&D programmes. 
 
Table 8. Effects of generic R&D grants on firm employment: Evidence from academic studies 
Study Country Programme Data Period Method Main finding 
Czarnitzki 
and Bento 
(2013) 
 Belgium 
(Flanders
) 
Matching R&D 
grant schemes 
from the agency 
for Innovation 
and Technology 
in Flanders 
(IWT) 
 4761 
firms 
 2002-2008  Matching 
method 
The treatment 
effect is larger for 
SMEs (10.19%) 
compared to the 
whole sample 
(9.57%). 
Bedu and 
Vandersto
cken 
(2015) 
France 
(Aquitain
e) 
Regional R&D 
grants for SMEs 
253 SMEs 2005-2010 Matching 
method 
The R&D 
employment 
growth rate is on 
average between 
46.5% and 48.9% 
in subsided firms 
compared to 
subsided firms 
(10.5% and 18%) 
.  
5.1.2 Impact on firms' economic and innovative performance 
Analysing the effects of generic R&D grants on innovative and economic performance, 
Liu and Rammer (2016) find that ZIM-funded firms (the Central Innovation Programmes 
for SMEs run by the German Federal Government) increase the share of innovative sales 
(from new-to-firm product innovation) by 1.8 percentage points for year t (i.e. in the 
year of the funding) and 2.3 percentage points for year t+1 (i.e. after two years) than 
non-ZIM-funded firms. In contrast, the Technology Programmes-funded firms 
(Technology Programmes support SMEs, large firms, and universities) increases the 
share of innovative sales (from new-to-firm product innovation) by 1.7 percentage 
points for year t and 3.2 percentage points for year t+1. Furthermore, for Technology 
Programmes, the effects on innovative sales' share (from new-to-market product 
innovation) are 2.7 percentage points in year t and 2.6 percentage points in year t+1, 
whereas these are not statically significant for ZIM financial scheme. These findings 
clearly suggest that Technology (i.e. cutting-edge novelty) Programmes perform better 
than central innovation funding in terms of new-to-market innovation, and new-to-firm 
innovation in the future.  
Other scholars suggests that generic R&D grants have a positive effects on firm 
shares of innovative sales when they are coupled both with firm specific 
characteristics such as firm human capital (i.e. absorptive capacity (19)) and 
collaborations with partners. Using firm data from Belgium, Hottenrott and Lopes-
Bento (2014) find that the effects of subsidy-induced R&D and the privately-induced 
R&D are the same. However, the coefficient of publicly induced R&D becomes larger 
                                          
18 Please note that the estimates of generic R&D grants are not directly comparable with those of R&D grants 
for innovative firms with growth potential because they are obtained using different econometric techniques.  
19 Firm absorptive capacity can be thought of as good proxy of firms’ knowledge base, and firms’ ability to 
absorb R&D from other firms. In most empirical works firm absorptive capacity is measured by firm human 
capital endowment (see Cohen and Klepper, 1992, and Klepper, 1997; among others).  
22 
 
when it interacts with collaboration dummy variables (both national, and international 
collaboration), suggesting that R&D grants have a positive effect on sales share form 
market novelties when the recipient firm collaborates with international partners. This 
positive effect does not appear when the collaboration dummy variables interact with 
private R&D. Radas et al. (2015) using data for Croatia confirm that R&D grants (20) 
modify the behaviour of those firms which benefited from them. More precisely, they find 
that firms receiving R&D grants are more likely to collaborate with research institutions 
than firms that did not receive the grant. This finding is rather interesting as it implies 
that R&D grants interact with other strategies and capabilities of firms.  
In addition, Radas et al. (2015) find that while the coefficient of direct grants on firm 
shares of innovative sales is statistically significant (i.e. on average funded-firms 
increase their percentage of sales from innovation by 11 percentage points than firms 
that were not funded), the coefficient of direct grants on the number of innovations is 
not significant, suggesting that public support help firms to introduce improvements to 
existing products rather than entirely new goods and services. Using the Irish Innovation 
Panel over the period 1994-2004, Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2010) find that public 
support for product development led to an increase in the plants' share of new and 
improved product sales by about 30%, while it led to a slightly lower increase (17%)  in 
the share of new products in plants' sales in Northern Ireland (21).  
To compare these findings to the evidence from R&D grants for young innovative firms 
with growth potential, we focus on those econometric studies having similar 
specification, similar period time, and same dependent variable (22). 
Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014), using data on R&D grants (from the Flemish agency 
for innovation and technology, IWT) for the period 2002-2008, finds that a one percent 
increase in subsidy-triggered R&D raises, on average, by 0.525 percent the sales' share 
in market novelties. In contrast, Soderblom et al. (2015), estimating the effect of VINN 
NU grants for the period 2002-2008, find that winning the grant raises annual sales by 
11.2 percentage points on average. Einio (2014), using R&D subsidy data provided by 
Tekes for the period 2000-2005, finds that the sales' growth of firms that have received 
the R&D support is higher than that of non-granted firms. Guo et al. (2016), using data 
on Innofund grant for the period 1999-2007, find that Innofund-backed firms are over 
59 percentages more likely to report higher sales from new products than non-
Innofound-backed firms.  
Finally, Liu and Rammer (2016) report a 2.1 difference in means for the Technology 
Programme on innovative sales' share from new-to-market product innovation, the 
matching estimates reported by Autio and Rannikko (2016) suggest that the NIY 
Programme has more than doubled the growth rate of treated firms. 
Thus, when looking at the impact of generic R&D grants on firm economic and innovative 
performance, the effects of R&D grants for young innovative firms are higher 
than generic R&D grants. The latter can be also be relevant for their performance if 
they satisfy the following criteria: (1) better targeted to firm R&D activities, i.e. e.g. 
targeting specific technologies (Liu and Rammer, 2016; among others) and (2) they 
stimulate firm collaboration (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2014; Radas et al., 2015). In 
other words, generic R&D grants can have a larger effect if they induce changes 
in firm behaviour (collaboration) and enhance firm ability to innovate 
(absorptive capacity).  
                                          
20 These are matching grants aimed at SMEs. Funding is based on the quality and creativity of proposed 
industry project. 
21 For Ireland, the regressions estimated report positive coefficients but they are not statistically significant. 
22 It is not completely obvious how to compare the estimates of generic R&D schemes with those of R&D grants 
for innovative firms with growth potential, because the estimates are affected by econometric techniques, 
dataset used in the analyses, country and period of time considered. Furthermore, the econometric 
analyses use different dependent variables. One way of alleviating this problem is to compare results from 
similar regression models covering similar time period. This assumes that firms operate in the same 
economy and occupy similar points in their innovation journeys or trajectories. 
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A limitation of the selected studies is that although most of empirical studies take into 
account firm collaboration, very few of them control for partner type and mode of 
collaboration. 
 
Table 9. Effects of generic R&D grants on firms' economic and innovative performance: Evidence 
from academic studies 
 
Study Country Programme Data Period Method Main finding 
Liu and Rammer 
(2016)  
Germany Central Innovation 
Programmes for 
SMEs (ZIM) 
Innovative 
SMEs 
2008-
2012 
Matching 
estimator 
Small and 
positive 
effects of 
national 
government 
R&D funding 
Hottenrott and 
Lopes-Bento 
(2014) 
Belgium Matching grants 
for SMEs in 
conducting R&D 
projects and 
encourage firms to 
collaborate 
1593 firms 2002-
2008 
Tobit Positive 
effects of 
R&D grants 
on sales 
share from 
market 
novelties 
Radas et al. 
(2015) 
Croatia R&D matching 
grants 
700 SMEs 2005-
2010 
Propensity 
matching 
The effect of 
grants on 
innovative 
sales for 
funded-firms 
tend to be 
greater than 
non-funded 
firms (by 11 
percentage 
points) 
Hewitt-Dundas 
and Roper (2010) 
Ireland Research and 
Technical 
Innovation (RTI) 
scheme  
Plant: 
1156 
1994-
2004 
IV Tobit Public support 
for product 
development 
increases the 
share of new 
products in 
plants' sales 
by 17 percent 
 
5.1.3 Impact on firms' innovative activities 
There are very few contributions investigating the effect of generic R&D grants and firms' 
innovative activities.  
In Germany, Depner et al. (2017) observe that 59.5% of the ZIM projects report market 
product innovation in 2014 and 2015.  
 
Table 10. Effects of generic R&D grants on firms' innovative activities: Evidence from policy 
evaluations 
Study Country Programme Data Period Method Product 
innovation 
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Depner et al. 
(2017) 
DE The Central 
Innovation 
Programme 
for SMEs 
(ZIM) 
108 
companies 
2013 Web-based 
survey 
59.50% 
 
Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2010) find that public support for product development 
increases the probability of reporting new or improved products by 1.2 percent in 
Northern Ireland. For Ireland, the regression estimated reports positive coefficient but it 
is not statistically significant. 
Czarnitzki and Litch (2006) estimate the impact of R&D grants on patent application for 
German firms, distinguishing between patent application induced by public funding and 
that financed by the firms' own resources. They find that government-induced R&D and 
privately financed R&D have the same effects on the firm’s propensity to apply for at 
least one patent.  
 
Table 11. Effects of generic R&D grants on firms' innovative activities: Evidence from academic 
studies 
Study Country Programme Data Period Method Product/Proce
ss innovation 
Hewitt-Dundas 
and Roper 
(2010) 
Ireland  Grants for 
R&D and 
innovation 
activity (RTDI 
scheme) 
Plant: 
1156 
1994-2004 IV probit Positive effect 
on product 
innovation 
Czarnitzki and 
Licht (2006) 
Germany R&D grants 735 
beneficiari
es 
1994-2000 Probit 
regressio
n 
Positive effects 
of public funding 
on firm patent 
application, 
although 
smaller than 
privately 
financed R&D. 
 
When comparing these findings to the evidence from R&D grants for young innovative 
firms with growth potential, we find that while the IV probit estimates obtained by 
Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2010) is 1.2 percent, Guo et al. (2016), using Innofund 
Programme data for the period 1999-2007, find that Innofund-backed firms are 13.2 
percentage points more likely to innovate than non-Innofund-backed firms.  
5.2 Results: R&D subsidies 
This section analyses the effect of R&D subsidies on firm employment, performance, and 
innovation. R&D subsidies comprise grants, loans, loan guarantees and R&D tax 
incentives (23).  
5.2.1 Impact on firm employment 
Falk (2005) examines additionality effects stemming from the R&D subsidies funded by 
the Austrian Industrial Research Promotion Fund (FFF)24 between 1995 and 2002. When 
                                          
23 See Edler et al. (2016) for an overview of major instruments of direct government funding. 
24 The support of the FFF (i.e. Austria’s most important source of finance for R&D projects carried out by 
business enterprises) comprises non-repayable grants, loans and guarantees for bank loans. 
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regressing the logarithm of scientific R&D personnel on the logarithm of R&D subsidies, 
the author finds that a one-percent increase in the amount of R&D subsidies granted 
increase firm scientific R&D staff by 0.04%. That is, firms supported by FFF-R&D 
subsidies show little variation in their demand for high-skilled R&D employment, after 
controlling for firm characteristics. When splitting the sample by firm size categories, the 
coefficient of R&D subsidies is a little larger (0.07%) for small firms (with less than 25 
employees) than for medium and larger firms (0.02 but not statistically significant). 
Afcha and Garcia-Quevedo (2014) investigate the impact of R&D subsidies 
(distinguishing from national and regional authorities) on firm R&D employment in 
Spain. When splitting the sample in SMEs and larger firms, the authors find that R&D 
subsidies lead to the recruitment of graduates and PhD holders in both types of firm. 
Dortet-Bernadet and Sicsic (2014), investigating the impact of R&D subsidies (both 
direct and indirect such as R&D tax credit) on French micro firms in R&D intensive 
sectors, find that R&D support leads to an increase in the number of highly skilled jobs of 
1,160 equivalent jobs in 2010 compared to 2003, i.e. the reference year. However, as 
the authors argue, compared with the amount received, especially from 2008 onwards, 
the effect of R&D subsidies is small. 
In conclusion, we find small positive effect of R&D programmes for SMEs, 
especially for those subsidies promoting R&D and high-technology projects that require 
qualified personnel (Afcha and Garcia-Quevedo, 2014). 
As far as generic R&D subsidies are concerned, an important implication of our findings 
is that the effectiveness of R&D programmes aiming at increasing firm innovation 
engagement may depend on human capital (see Afcha and Garcia-Quevedo, 2015). 
 
Table 12. Effects of R&D subsidies on firm employment: Evidence from academic studies 
Study Country Programme Data Period Method Main finding 
Falk (2005)  Austria R&D grants 1064 firms 1995-2002 Fixed effect 
model  
The effect is larger 
in small firms 
(0.07%)  compared 
to medium and 
larger firms (0.02)  
 
Dortet-
Bernadet and 
Sicsic (2016) 
France Support to 
R&D 
(including 
and 
Research 
Tax credit 
CIR, and 
JEI) 
2261 small 
firms 
2003-2010 Matching 1,160 additional 
jobs in 2010 
compared to 2003 
Afcha and 
Garcia-
Quevedo 
(2014) 
Spain R&D support 
from 
regional, and 
national 
authorities 
12283 
firms 
2006-2011 Matching 
method 
Positive effect of 
national subsidies 
on R&D 
employment both in 
SMEs and larger 
firms 
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5.2.2 Impact on firms' economic and innovative performance 
Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2016) find that receiving public support (25) for new product 
development increases innovative sales from new products by 4.9 percent, while it 
increases innovative sales from new and improved products by 6.4 percent, controlling 
for other factors. In addition, they find that public subsidies influence firm share of 
innovative sales by increasing the quality or novelty of innovation output, firm human 
capital endowment, and firm's ability to establish cooperative relationships (26). 
Garcia and Mohnen (2010), using CIS data from Austria, find that national government 
R&D support has a higher impact on firms share of sales from new to market product 
innovation (3.4%) than on firm share of sales from new to firm product innovation 
(2.5%)27. They conclude that true innovators have higher payoff in terms of innovative 
sales from R&D subsidies than imitators.  
When focusing on subsidies that provide R&D support to recipients in high tech sectors, 
the estimates of the effects become larger. Arvanitis et al. (2010), for instance, 
investigate the effect of CTI policy (Technology policy28 in Switzerland) on high-tech firm 
innovative performance. They find that subsidized-firms increase their percentage of 
innovative sales from significantly improved or modified products by 12 percentage 
points than non-subsidized firms, and their innovative sales from new-to-firm and new-
to market innovation by 10 percentage points. Moreover, they find that the larger the 
subsidy (in relative terms), the larger its impact.  
One study investigating the effects that R&D subsidies (both from German and EU 
government) have on young innovative companies (YICs)' (29) share of innovative sales 
is by Schneider and Veugelers (2010). Their findings indicate that although YICs show a 
higher innovative performance than other firms, the effect of R&D subsidies on their 
innovative performance is not statistically significant, suggesting that YICs tend to be 
financially more R&D self-sufficient than other firms. Furthermore, when using 
instrumental variables (IV) estimation, the estimate of R&D subsidies becomes negatives 
for YICs. The authors argue that in case of Germany the system of allocating 
subsidies is not effective in dealing with the specific nature and problems of 
YICs. 
All in all, when looking at the impact of R&D subsidies on firm economic and innovative 
performance, the effects of R&D grants for young innovative firms are higher than 
those of R&D subsidies, but the latter are shown to be effective only if the grants 
acknowledge the difference of sector of economic activities and concentrate on high-tech 
sectors, and if they interact with firm absorptive capacity. 
 
Table 13. Effects of R&D subsidies on firms' economic and innovative performance: Evidence from 
                                          
25 Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2016) use data from the Irish Innovation Panel (IIP) for a sample of Irish 
manufacturing plants over the period 1991-2011. Respondents were asked: "Have you received 
government support for product development over the last three years?" and "Have you received 
government support for R&D not linked to any specific product development?". 
26 The authors identify four possible effects of public subsidies: the effect of subsidies on innovation inputs (the 
so-called legacy input additionality); the effects of subsidies on firm's human capital endowment (the so-
called congenial additionality); the effects of subsidies on innovation output (the so-called legacy output 
additionality); the effects of subsidies on firm network and technical skills (the so-called legacy inter-
organisational and experiential additionality). 
27 They also find that EU support for innovation (EU 4th and 5th Framework Programmes for R&D) does not 
significantly affect the variables of interest. 
28 The Commission of Technology and Innovation (CTI), the most important government agency for the 
promotion of innovation in Switzerland, supports R&D co-operation projects from scientific fields 
(machinery and apparatus construction as well as information technology) by funding the public partner (a 
university or a public research institution) in such cooperation, the private partner being an enterprise that 
agrees to contribute to this project at its own expense by at least the amount of funds offered by the CTI 
(private contribution of at least 50%). 
29 In this study, YICs are defined as firms with less than 6 years old, less than 250 employees and at least 15% 
of their revenues on R&D. 
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academic studies 
Study Country Programme Data Period Method Main 
finding 
Roper and 
Hewitt-Dundas 
(2016) 
Ireland support for NPD (new 
product development) 
Plant: 
3254 
1991-
2011 
Tobit model Public 
support from 
new product 
development 
increases 
innovative 
sales from 
new and 
improved 
product by 
6.4 percent 
Garcia and 
Mohnen (2010)  
Austria Public support for 
innovation (both R&D 
grants and R&D tax 
credit) from national 
and EU governments 
 
1287 
firms 
1998-
2000 
System of 
simultaneous 
equations 
with limited 
dependent 
variables 
(Probit and 
Tobit model) 
National 
government 
support 
increase firm 
share of 
sales from 
new to 
market 
product 
innovation, 
and firm 
share of 
sales from 
new to firm 
product 
innovation 
by 3.4% and 
2.5% 
respectively 
Schneider and 
Veugelers 
(2010) 
Germany National, regional and 
EU funding (R&D 
subsidies and tax 
incentives) 
1715 
firms 
2002-
2004 
OLS, Tobit, 
IV methods 
Positive 
effect of 
R&D 
subsidies for 
all firms, 
expect for 
YICs 
Arvanitis et al. 
(2010) 
Switzerland CTI subsidy  1195 
firms 
2000-
2002 
Matching Positive 
effects on 
innovation 
performance 
 
5.2.3 Impact on firms' innovative activities 
Most econometric studies have examined the question of whether national or European 
R&D support has larger impact on innovation than regional R&D support (see Becker et 
al., 2014; Marzucchi and Montresor, 2012; Huergo and Moreno, 2014; Albors-Garrigos 
and Barrera, 2011; Herrera and Ibarra, 2010; Czarnitski and Lopes-Bento, 2014).  
Becker et al. (2014) using survey data from the Spanish National Innovation panel 
(PITEC) find that regional support seems most influential for product (22%), 
organisational (33%), management (about 38%) and marketing innovation (45%), 
whereas national innovation support is associated with a higher probability of product or 
service innovation (about 37%). They also find that only national and EU support prove 
important in positively affecting new-to-the market innovation (26% and 37% 
respectively). This finding seems to be confirmed by Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014). 
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They find that firms that received national funding sources patent more than firms 
without subsidy, and such effects tend to be larger if firms had received European grants 
in addition. Moreover, they find that national and European funding are also relevant in 
affecting the number of forward citations, suggesting that funded firms (only national or 
in combination with EU funds) are not only "the right" targets but are also capable to 
generate valuable technology (30). 
Various studies such as Huergo and Moreno (2014), Albors-Garrigos and Barrera (2011), 
and Herrera and Ibarra (2010) find that national R&D policies are effective in increasing 
the firm likelihood of introducing innovation when they are targeted to particular 
technologies and sectors, and when they interact with firm absorptive capacity. Huergo 
and Moreno (2014) analyse the impact of two financial schemes, broadly CDTI (Centre 
for the Development of Industrial Technology) loan programme and national subsidy 
programme, on firm probability of reporting product and process innovation. They find 
that a higher probability of reporting product innovation (1.8%) is related to the 
participation in CDTI loan programme (as opposed to the national subsidy system). The 
national subsidy significantly affects firm likelihood to report process innovation (0.3%), 
but the influence of the CDTI loan programme is higher compared to the national 
subsidy (0.7%). This picture that favours the CDTI loan over the national subsidy may 
lean on detailed knowledge of the CDTI regarding the firm innovation process. Albors-
Garrigos and Barrera (2011) study the effect of national and regional R&D support on 
innovation using a non-linear model. They find the relevance of both regional and nation 
subsidies in low-tech firms' innovation, whereas national subsidies perform better than 
regional subsidies in high-tech sample. The authors conclude that national policies 
aiming at supporting firm innovation would produce the effect of increasing their 
performance when the firm increase their R&D intensity, their cooperative skills and are 
open to external partners and innovation sources. Herrera and Ibarra (2010) confirm 
this hypothesis that is subsidies are more effective in increasing the likelihood of a firm 
to innovate when they are closely linked to firm absorptive capacity. More precisely, they 
find that R&D subsidies have a significant effect on large firms' propensity for patenting 
both in the year when they receive the subsidy and in the following year, whereas SMEs 
need more time to report a positive effect of the subsidies received. The authors use this 
evidence to argue that the previous R&D experience is the most important variable to 
gain access to R&D subsidies.  
Two econometric studies (Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Hujer and Radic, 2005) use 
micro data to study the effect of R&D subsidies on innovation in a sample of SMEs in 
Germany. Hujer and Radic (2005) look at the effect of R&D subsidies (including tax 
incentives) on different degree of product innovation (new product/service, and 
improvements of existing products/services). They find that R&D subsidies have positive 
effects on new product/service for SMEs only, indicating that R&D subsidies lead to new 
radical innovation among SMEs. 
One econometric study addresses the question: what are the effects of tax credits and 
R&D grants compared to tax credits only on innovation? Using a matching method, 
Berube and Mohnen (2009) find that in the sample of firms that used tax credits and 
grants, the proportion of those which have made a world-first innovation is 25.29%, 
against only 17.24% of those that used tax credits only. The proportions are larger when 
considering the other outcome variable (i.e. dummy for more than two product 
innovations): 67.7% of firms that used both policy instruments, against 50.86% of firms 
used only tax credit. Such finding suggests that firms make better innovation if they 
received R&D grants and tax credit than if they received tax credit only. The next 
chapter will examine further this important issue. 
We now discuss how these empirical findings are different from those from R&D grants 
                                          
30 Forward citations are typically interpreted as proxy for the importance, the quality, or the significance of a 
patented invention. Empirical studies such as Hall et al. (2005) and Jaffe et al. (2000) show that forward 
citations are highly correlated with the private value of the patented inventions, and reflect the economic 
and technological importance as perceived by the inventors themselves.  
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for innovative firms with growth potential. 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014), using German innovation survey data for the period 
1992-2006, find that firms that received funding from national support are 4.6 
percentage points more likely to file a patent than firms without subsidy, and such effect 
tend to be larger if firms had got European grants in addition (7%). Over the same time 
period (1999-2007), Guo et al. (2016), using Innofund programme data for the period 
1999-2007, find that Innofund-backed firms are 13.2 percentage points more likely to 
generate new patent than non-Innofund-backed firms.  
Yet, Aiello et al. (2016), using Italian data for the period 2001-2009, finds that R&D 
support increase firm probability of patenting by 4 percentage points. In contrast, 
Widman (2016), using data for Basis Programme in Austria for the period 2002-2005, 
find that government research grants increases firm propensity to file a patent by 10 
percentage points. 
The extant literature is limited in a number of respects. Few of these studies report how 
the effect change over time or do not control for multiple treatment effects, i.e. firms 
receiving funding from different sources (e.g. tax credits combined with grants) (31). 
Furthermore, few studies investigate the relevance of those policy measures in 
macroeconomic terms. There is also little evidence of the effect soft measures that can 
be delivered with the subsidies or in addition to it (networking, learning effects, 
cooperation, etc.) because of the unavailability of appropriate measures for mostly 
intangible inputs. 
 
Table 14. Effects of R&D subsidies on firms' innovative activities: Evidence from academic studies 
Study Country Programme Data Period Method Main finding 
Huergo 
and 
Moreno 
(2014) 
Spain R&D subsidies 
vs soft loans 
4300 firms 2002-
2005 
Probit 
model 
Positive effect on 
product and process 
innovation, especially 
when subsidies are 
better R&D oriented. 
Czarnitzki 
and 
Hussinger 
(2004) 
Germany R&D grants 
from the 
German 
Federal 
Government 
3799 firms 1992-
2000 
Matching 
and system 
of equations 
Positive effects on 
patents, especially for 
SMEs 
Becker et 
al. (2014)  
Spain R&D support 
from regional, 
national, and 
EU authorities 
Innovative 
firms (SMEs 
and large 
firms) 
2004-
2012 
two-stage 
estimation 
model  
National and EU 
support in positively 
affecting new-to-the 
market innovation 
(26% and 37% 
respectively) 
Albors-
Garrigos 
and 
Barrera 
(2011)  
Spain R&D support 
from regional, 
national, and 
EU authorities 
3000 
innovative 
firms  
2005 Logistic 
regression 
National subsidies 
perform better than 
regional subsidies in 
high-tech sample 
Herrera 
and Ibarra 
(2010) 
Spain R&D support 
from regional, 
national, and 
EU authorities 
1718 
Innovative 
firms  
1999-
2001 
Matching Positive effect of 
subsidies, especially 
for larger firms 
                                          
31 A clear exception is Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013). 
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Czarnitzki 
and 
Lopes-
Bento 
(2014) 
Germany R&D support 
from regional, 
national, and 
EU authorities 
6106 firms 1992-
2006 
Matching Positive effects on 
both patent and 
number of forward 
citations, especially 
when national grants 
are combined with EU 
grants 
Hujer and 
Radic 
(2005) 
Germany R&D grants, 
wage 
subsidies, and 
tax incentives 
2714 plants 1997-
2000 
Matching Positive effects of 
R&D subsidies on new 
products/services for 
SMEs 
Berube 
and 
Mohnen 
(2009) 
Canada R&D grants + 
Tax credits 
2785 
manufacturing 
plants 
2002-
2004 
Matching Positive effect on 
innovation when 
firms receive both 
R&D grants and tax 
credit 
Aiello et 
al. (2016) 
Italy Three policy 
measures: 1) 
R&D grants; 
2) R&D tax 
incentives; 3) 
R&D grants 
+R&D tax 
incentives 
3788 SMEs 2001-
2009 
Probit 
model 
R&D policy increases 
firm probability of 
patenting by 4% 
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6 A comparison of impacts of R&D grants for young 
innovative firms with growth potential versus R&D tax 
incentives 
This section focuses on the effects of tax incentives on firm employment, economic and 
innovative performance, and firm innovation activities. We discuss whether and for what 
reason the R&D grants may be preferred to a tax incentive in case of young innovative 
companies. The analysis draws solely on econometric studies comparing the estimates of 
the impact of R&D grants versus tax incentives.  
There are few empirical examples of work on the comparison of the effects of R&D 
grants versus tax incentives on employment, economic and innovative performance and 
innovation. Colombo et al. (2012) examines the difference in effects between R&D 
grants and tax incentive on employment. Using panel data analysis (i.e FE-IV estimator) 
between 1994 and 2003, the study shows that the introduction of grants has the effect 
of increasing, (2 year after the treatment) the new technology-based firms employment 
growth by 56 percent for young firms, whereas tax incentives are negatively related to 
employment growth for young firms. When testing the statistical validity of average 
treatment effects of both types of subsidies, selective subsidies (i.e. grants) exert a 
statistically greater average treatment effect than automatic subsidies (i.e. tax 
incentives) on the employment growth of young new technology-based firms during the 
2-year period following the receipt of the subsidies, whereas no such effect is found for 
more established new technology-based firms. However, the evidence remains limited to 
the specific Italian context.  
Table 15. Effect of R&D grants vs tax incentive on firm employment: Evidence from academic 
studies 
 Country Programme Data Period Method Employment 
growth rate 
Colombo 
et al. 
(2012) 
IT Grants vs tax incentives 
to support new 
technology-based firms. 
428 firms 1994-
2003 
FE-IV Grants are 
more 
beneficial 
than tax 
incentives for 
young firms 
Grilli and Murtinu (2012) discuss the effects of R&D grants and tax incentives on TFP of 
Italian new-technology based firms. They find that the total factor productivity increases 
by 25 per cent more than when using other schemes when Italian NTBFs receive R&D 
grants on a competitive basis, whereas the effect of tax credits was not significant.  
Radas et al. (2015) using data on matching grants for Croatian SMEs, find that the 
matching estimate for tax incentives and subsidies (13.82) is only slightly larger than 
the matching estimate for subsidy only (13.31), suggesting that the addition of tax 
incentives does not bring significant benefit if compared to subsidies alone.  
Table 16. Effect of R&D grants vs tax incentive on firm performance: Evidence from academic 
studies 
Study Country Programme Data Period Method Total factor 
productivity 
growth  
Grilli and 
Murtinu 
(2012)  
IT Grants vs tax 
incentive 
247 new 
technology-
based firms 
1994-2003 GMM-
system 
Only R&D grants 
contribute to 
increase firm’ TFP 
growth 
Radas et al. Croatia Grants vs tax 700 SMEs 2005-2010 Matching Tax incentives does 
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(2015) incentives not bring significant 
benefit if compared 
to subsidies alone. 
 
Two studies (Falk, 2009; and Berube and Mohnen, 2009) link the effects of R&D grants 
and tax incentives and firm innovation. They show that the combination of R&D grants 
and tax incentives are more effective in increasing firm innovation. Using R&D survey 
data, Falk (2009) investigates how the probability of successful innovation changes when 
firms use tax incentive rather than direct grants. He finds that firms funded through 
taxation are 14 percentage points more likely to report radical innovations than their 
non-R&D subsidized counterparts. Firms funded through direct support are 17 
percentage points more likely to report successful radical innovation. All else being 
equal, subsidized firms through both tax and direct funding are 24 percentage points 
more likely to report radical innovation than non-R&D subsidized firms. Using the 2005 
Survey of Innovation from Statistics in Canada, Berube and Mohnen (2009) study the 
effects of tax credits and grants on innovation, in terms of 1) the nature of innovations, 
2) the number of new or significantly improved products, and 3) the economic success of 
newly introduced products (measured by the percentage of revenue from first-to-market 
or already-on-the-market innovation). When focusing on the nature of innovation, the 
authors find that 25.29% of the firms that used both instruments made a world-first 
innovation during the three years considered, against only 17.24% among those that 
used tax credits only. When considering the number of new or significantly improved 
products, 80.47% of the firms that used both instruments made at least one innovation 
during the period considered, while 71.8% did so among the firms that used tax credit 
only. When looking at the economic success of newly introduced products, 60.79% of 
firms that claimed tax credits and received grants reported having at least some 
commercial success, whereas only 52.49% of the firms that claimed only tax credits 
reported the same. Very similar results are obtained when testing the dataset for the 
specification concerning firm percentage of revenue from first-to-market innovation: 
52.8% of the firms using both instruments, compared with 38.8% of the firms using tax 
credits only, declared a percentage of revenue above 3% due to first-to-market 
innovations.  
 
Table 17. Effect of R&D grants vs tax incentive on firms' innovative activities: Evidence from 
academic studies 
Study Country Programme Data Period Method Innovation 
Falk 
(2009) 
AT Tax vs direct 
research 
funding 
4517 firms 2005-2007 Qualitative 
models 
14% vs 17% 
Berube 
and 
Mohnen 
(2009) 
Canada R&D grants and 
tax incentives 
vs R&D tax 
incentives only 
2785 plants 2002-2004 Matching 25.29% vs 17.24% 
80.47% vs 71.8% 
60.79% vs 52.49% 
 
To summarise, the literature studying and comparing the results of R&D 
subsidies and tax incentives is limited and even more when analysing their effects 
on firm employment, innovation, and economic and innovative performance. Still, the 
literature review suggests that tax incentives are not a substitute but play a 
complementary role to R&D grants and such combination can positively affect 
firm's ability to develop new products. The studies of Falk (2009) and Berube and 
Mohnen (2009) corroborate the idea that R&D grants and tax incentives are 
complementary. Other scholars such as Grilli and Murtinu (2012) and Radas et al. 
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(2015) have instead suggested the predominance of R&D grants compared to tax 
incentive in increasing firm performance, especially when R&D projects are of high 
technological value. They argue that the amount of R&D that can be performed due to 
tax incentives is likely to be inadequate for more ambitious R&D project given the set-up 
of a tax incentive that requires from the firm the investment being funded by the 
company upfront, which may be difficult for a financially constrained companies and tend 
to cover only costs related to R&I expenses (with different definitions of expenses that 
may increase the administrative burden of small companies). 
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7 Lessons learnt on the design and implementations 
7.1 Lessons learnt from policy evaluations: key takeaways 
The gathered evidence provides us also with more general lessons learnt on the design 
and implementation of financial support for innovative ventures with growth potential. As 
already stressed in OECD review, 2011 and Cunningham et al. 2013 the outcomes of a 
given programme are heavily dependent both on its design and also on its subsequent 
implementation. 
The R&D grants may target different population of firms – specific sectors or 
technologies applied in the projects, specific types of firms (young, R&D intensive, 
specific regions, etc.) and problems (e.g. financially constrained). In our sample of 
evaluations, the targets where technology/sector (high-tech companies) and 
growth readiness of companies – more constrained selection criteria and more costly 
based on the evaluation on managerial skills/expansion plans/etc.  
Only one of the evaluations studied, the Finnish Young Innovative Companies 
programme, applied a milestone approach, i.e. gradual selection of companies 
being ready to grow or being able to continue to grow. Whereas US SBIR 
programme and the European Commission Horizon 2020 SME Instrument divides funding 
into phases that are moving the company closer to the market and the funding is 
adapted to each of the phases, the Finnish programme selection process was adapted to 
companies’ specifics (KPIs) offering a very targeted support. 
The evidence from the evaluations of the US SBIR programme and other literature 
(Cunningham et al, 2013) stress the signalling effect of grants as a significant 
contributor to the ability of a company to attract further funding. In other words, being 
able to attract a grant can act as positive signal both for private investors (SBIR study of 
the effect of the grants on the possibility to attract venture capital) and evaluators of 
public funding. For companies that lack a long track record of sales, profitability or a 
patents, grant history can provide more credibility among private investors. It would be 
interesting to see if the prestige of the grants correlates with the ability to attract further 
funding. 
Policy evaluations also point to the added value of complementary services and 
indeed many grants include advice, training, coaching and networking (Autio and 
Ranniko, 2016; for instance, see also Cunningham et al. 2013 for a detailed analysis). 
The venture capital literature (Ueda 2004, Hellman and Puri 2002) also stresses that 
part of the rationale of the choice of venture capital over debt is explained by the added 
value of services accompanying the funding (coaching, managerial advice and 
networking opportunities). Therefore the involvement of skilled managers and advisors 
in the implementation of grant programmes may amplify the effects of the grant. Table 
20 summaries the differences in policy design of both R&D grants for young innovative 
firms with growth potential and generic R&D grants (32). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
32 The policy design for R&D subsidies cannot be drawn as they involve a mix of policy instruments.  
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Table 18. Summary of R&D grants' design 
R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth potential 
Description Advantages Challenges 
R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth potential 
 Phased approach to funding, 
often linked to performance 
 Funding is mostly delivered 
together with additional 
services (training, mentoring, 
advice) 
 Small cohorts of firms 
 Eligibility criteria more detailed 
and focused that for generic 
grants (e.g. specific sectors, 
experience of project 
managers, company's age 
limits) 
 
 Phased approach 
allows for 
distribution of the 
funding based on 
results and not 
only on project 
proposals 
 
 Added-value 
services help the 
entrepreneurs to 
deliver the project 
to the market 
 Clear milestones should be 
set up to monitor the 
process if phased approach 
applied 
 
 Problems with picking 
winners if eligibility criteria 
very stringent 
 
Generic grants 
 Single grant  
 Financial support rarely linked 
with additional services 
 Larger cohorts of firms 
 Eligibility criteria more 
generic: R&D intensity, 
company's size, no age limits 
 Simple 
administrative 
rules 
 
 Risk more equally 
distributed due to 
larger cohorts 
 
 Risk of funding mostly new 
to the firm innovation 
and/or issues with 
commercialisation given the 
lack of support during the 
project development 
 
 
7.2 Lessons learnt from the academic studies: key takeaways 
Most econometric studies investigate the effects that R&D grants for innovative 
enterprises with growth potential have on their economic and innovative performance 
and innovation, controlling for a set of variables ranging from: (a) past R&D grants, (b) 
the amount of R&D grants, (c) lagged values of dependent variables, (d) the presence of 
financial constraints, (e) funding indicators, and (f) the presence of different type of R&D 
grants. We discuss these control variables in turn: 
a) Grant history. The aim is to ascertain whether past R&D grants (e.g. lagged 
values of R&D grants) affect firm performance. Most empirical studies control for 
publicly supported R&D projects in the past (see, for instance, Czarnitzki and 
Litcht, 2006). The main prior hypothesis behind these studies is that firms 
supported by public R&D grants in the past display a higher economic and 
innovative performance, after controlling for other factors.  
b) The amount of R&D grants. Whether performance outcomes of innovative 
firms with growth potential are affected by the amount of R&D grants is tested by 
regressing firm performance against the usual set of independent variables, 
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including the amount of R&D grant together with other control variables (see 
Gicheva et al, 2016; Koski and Pajarinen, 2011; Guo et al., 2016).  
c) Time lag of dependent variables. When extending the time frame over which 
the outcomes variables are measured, the results are shown to become stronger 
with time. Widmann (2016), for instance, find evidence that the effects become 
stronger over time. He finds the highest point estimate for years 3 and 4 after the 
funding application. After year 4, the estimated treatment effect 
disappears/declines. In addition, several studies such as Soderblom et al. (2015) 
and Colombo et al. (2013) use lagged values in order to avoid simultaneity 
between the dependent variables and the covariates. In the case of venture 
capital, the effect starts to be positive in the fifth year after the investment (see 
more in Szkuta et al. 2017). 
d) Financial constraints. Whether performance indicators for young innovative 
firms with growth potential are affected by financial constraints is tested by 
including indicators of financial constraints within the firm among the set of 
regressors. The expectation is that financial constraints are greater for young 
innovative firms with growth potential than others. The presence of financial 
constraints is ascertained using control factors such as the amount of fixed assets 
and equity assets (see Soderblom et al., 2015; Koski and Pajarinen, 2011; 
Bronzini and Piselli, 2016; Einio, 2014; Grilli and Murtinu, 2012; Guo et al. 2016). 
e) Funding indicators. Empirical studies use different public innovation funding 
schemes at different levels of disaggregation: the regional (State / regional 
Governments), the national (Federal / National Government) and the European 
(EU Commission and multilateral Programmes). These indicators of public funding 
data are meant to capture how different types of funding affect firm performance. 
However, the data itself has limitations as a measure of innovation funding as 
firms participating in the survey might not be able to differentiate between 
different sources of funding (e.g., regional funding and structural funds (co-
management)).  
f) Characterististics of R&D grants. An interesting piece of information concerns 
the type of R&D grants across firms. This information allows the verification of 
firm performance resulting from collaborative links between firms, and between 
firms and universities. Data for R&I collaboration (a dummy variable assigning a 
value of one to those firms which assert to collaborate with a research institution) 
and national and international collaboration (dummies assigning a value of one if 
firms reported to collaborate with national or/and international partners) are 
included in the econometric specifications used to test such hypothesis.  
 
7.2.1 Limitations of econometric approaches 
In what follows, we briefly discuss some potential problems stemming from the 
application of econometric methods (33). These are: 
 Survey data. In survey data, firms are asked to report whether they engaged in 
R&D, whether they have experienced or expect to report a positive turnover change. 
Using self-reporting data, some errors, optimism bias and uncertainty in variables 
may emerge and this may cause biases in the estimations. 
 Skewed distribution of the effect. Policy makers are especially concerned with 
changes in employment/sales distributions; for example, among subsidized firms, it 
is mostly the large getting larger, with employment at the lower decile unchanging. 
As Edler et al. (2016) argue, there are only few studies (Lee, 2011; González et al. 
2005) reporting evidence on how R&D Programmes affect such distributions. In our 
selected studies, this issue is only addressed by Girma et al. (2010). However, it is 
                                          
33 Annex 5 discusses in depth the econometric issues emerged from our selected empirical studies. 
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less clear how the employment effects changes according to age and size 
distributions. 
 Unobservables related to R&D funding (e.g. networking, learning effects). 
There are few studies investigating the influence of R&D Programmes on firm 
behaviour. Scholars such as Edler et al. (2016) have highlighted the change in 
behaviour among firms benefiting from R&D policy (e.g. increase collaboration; 
changes to organisational routines and other firm capabilities). While firm behaviour 
is difficult to capture, omitting such unobservables can lead to understating the 
effects of R&D Programmes.  
 Biased sample. The greatest effect of R&D Programmes should be observable for 
firms that do not undertake R&D activities on regular basis. Unfortunately, this type 
of firms is hard to isolate in empirical studies. Thus, samples used tend to be biased 
in favour of more or less continuous R&D performers. 
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8 Conclusions 
This study seeks to gather and compare evidence on the impact of R&D grant schemes 
for innovative enterprises with growth potential. With recourse to both policy evaluation 
studies and academic literature, it analyses the effects of R&D grants aimed at 
supporting innovative enterprises with growth potential on a set of output variables: 
employment, innovation, and firm economic and innovative performance.  
Two main results arise from our review of the evaluation reports and econometric 
studies on the effectiveness of targeted R&D grants on employment: 
1. There is robust empirical evidence of the positive impact of R&D grants for young 
innovative companies on employment (Koski and Pajarinen, 2011; Girma et al., 
2010; Einio, 2014). The collected information from policy evaluations can be synthesised 
into values ranging from 36% and 50% of the surveyed beneficiaries reporting an 
increase in employment attributed to the grant. In particular, the evidence includes two 
Programmes (The AplusB Programme and the Young Innovative Companies Programme) 
resulting in granted firms employing more than twice as many employees as non-
granted firms. When considering the average number of employees increase, it ranges 
from 7 to 16 per granted firms. This result is consistent with the average number of 
employees (12) in the econometric study by Girma et al. (2010).  
2. Those R&D grants are more effective over the medium to long term (Colombo et 
al., 2013; Forfas, 2012; Ploder et al., 2015; and Koski and Pajarinen, 2011). It is very 
likely that firms that received R&D grants will experience an increase in employment in a 
long run. However, our evidence does not allow drawing conclusions on the estimated 
time lag. Colombo et al. (2013) show that R&D grants influence the employment growth 
of young new technology-based firms only two years after the receipt of the grant. Such 
two-year time lag is confirmed by Forfas (2012) which would be a normal duration of a 
small R&D project.  
The results on the effect of R&D grants for innovative enterprises with growth potential 
on innovative and economic performance show that: 
1. Those R&D grants increase sales, and share of innovative sales. A vast majority 
of funded firms (values between 41% and 92%) increase their sales after the grant. 
The literature (Grilli and Murtinu, 2012; Soderblom et al, 2015; Autio and Rannikko, 
2016) shows positive effects on firm total factor productivity and sales growth. However, 
these scholars also suggest that positive effects on TFP and sales' growth take from two 
to four years to appear.   
Interestingly, the venture capital literature points to a five year time lag in the effect 
on turnover and profitability as in the short post-investment term firms are going 
through significant changes in their organisation and processes that may actually have 
negative impact on their turnover or profitability (Nesta 2009, Cowling et al. 2008).  
2. The presence of growth boosting effects, i.e. firms continue to grow for several 
years following the receipt of the subsidy (Autio and Ranniko, 2016; Soderblom et al., 
2015).This might be because the receipt of a prestigious and highly competitive 
government subsidy provides an important quality signal, allowing to access other types 
of funding (e.g. equity finance). 
3. Those R&D grants are more beneficial when ? helping firms to develop new 
capabilities and knowledge. R&D grants turn to be an efficient stimulus for 
R&D/innovation when firms interact with other organisations (universities or firms) to 
introduce new capabilities and knowledge (see Autio and Ranniko, 2016; Gicheva and 
Link, 2016).  
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The main result from our studies on the effects of R&D grants on innovation is: 
1. Increasing product innovation and patent application. The descriptive statistics 
from policy evaluations show that between 29% and 61% of granted firms were 
engaged in product or service innovation after receiving public support. Econometric 
studies show that R&D grants increase firm propensity to file a patent 
application, after controlling for other variables.   The time elapsed between R&D 
grants and innovation is at least four years according to Widmann, 2016.  
The results of comparative analysis show that the effects of R&D grants for young 
innovative firms with growth potential on firm share of innovative sales, 
employment, and innovative activities are generally higher than the effects of both 
generic R&D grants and R&D subsidies.  
 
Table 19. Summary of findings from the comparative analysis 
R&D grants for young 
innovative firms with 
growth potential 
Generic R&D grants R&D subsidies 
Effects on employment 
 Granted firms on average 
hire by about 14 
employees more than 
non-granted firms 
(Soderblom et al. 2015) 
 Positive and large effect 
on employment (Einio, 
2014). 
 Generic R&D grants 
effects tend to be larger 
for SMEs than large firms. 
Very little evidence. 
 Small positive effect of 
R&D subsidies (Falk, 
2005; Dortet-Bernadet 
and Sicsic, 2014; Afcha 
and Garciia-Quevedo, 
2014) 
Effects on firms' economic and innovative performance 
 Winning the grant raises 
annual sales by 11.2 
percentage points on 
average (Soderblom et 
al., 2015). Granted firms 
report higher sales' 
growth than non-granted 
firms on average (Einio, 
2014) 
 Innofund-backed firms 
are over 59 percentages 
more likely to report 
higher sales from new 
products than non-
Innofound-backed firms 
(Guo et al. 2016) 
 A one percent increase in 
subsidy-triggered R&D 
raises, on average, by 
0.525 percent the sales' 
share in market novelties 
(Hottenrott and Lopes-
Bento, 2014) 
 Impact on firms share of 
sales from new to market 
product innovation 
(3.4%) and slightly lower 
impact on firm share of 
sales from new to firm 
product innovation 
(2.5%) Garcia and 
Mohnen (2010) 
 12 percentage points 
higher increase in the 
percentage of innovative 
sales from significantly 
improved or modified 
products than non-
subsidized firms, and 10 
percentage points their 
innovative sales from 
new-to-firm and new-to 
market innovation 
(Arvanitis et al., 2010) 
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Effects on innovative activities 
 Innofund-backed firms 
are 13.2 percentage 
points more likely to 
innovate than non-
Innofund-backed firms 
(Guo et al. 2016) 
 Government research 
grants increases firm 
propensity to file a patent 
by 10 percentage points 
(Widman, 2016) 
 1.2 percent increase in 
the probability of 
reporting new or 
improved products by 
(Hewitt-Dundas and 
Roper, 2010) 
 Firms that received 
funding from national 
support are 4.6 
percentage points more 
likely to file a patent than 
firms without subsidy 
(Czarnitzki and Lopes-
Bento, 2014) 
 R&D support increase firm 
probability of patenting by 
4 percentage points 
(Aiello et al. 2016) 
 
Finally, we find very limited evidence on the effects of tax incentives compared to 
R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth potential on employment, and 
firm innovative performance, and innovation. Still the available empirical studies 
reviewed show that: 
 There is little impact of tax incentives on increasing firm innovative 
performance.  
 The combination of R&D grants and tax incentives is more effective in 
increasing firm innovation than using only one instrument.  
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9 Policy implications 
There are several policy implications related to the conditions under which R&D grants 
for innovative enterprises with growth potential can yield positive results. Although these 
implications are derived from a limited number of studies and in many cases the 
evaluations fail to disentangle the effects of the policy mix and to quantify the effects of 
specific policy interventions, especially in the countries where tax incentives are used for 
majority of R&D active firms and are coupled with many other support measures. For all 
the reasons above the implications put forward should be treated with caution. 
1. R&D grants - by motivating companies to innovate -stimulate and prepare them for 
the growth phase. 
2. Targeted funding (with a technology focus) delivers better results for 
disruptive innovations, whereas generic grants for SMEs are better suited for 
knowledge diffusion as they mostly deliver new to the firm rather than new to the 
market results. In other words, there is an offset between the investment in the general 
innovativeness of small firms and specific more targeted and riskier instruments for 
those motivated to grow. 
3. Selection mechanisms within programmes built on milestones or subsequent 
phases of the funding depending on the results are still rarely used. Even though, the 
effects for those grants on firms' employment and economic performance are very 
positive. This calls for a greater use of this type of mechanisms. 
4. R&D grants for innovative firms with growth potential designed in an attractive and 
competitive way help companies to attract follow-up funding (signalling effect is 
present especially for equity). 
5. Financial measures bring better results when accompanied by soft instruments e.g., 
support the firm organisational capacity for growth (capacity boosting, see Autio 
and Rannikko, 2016). Thus may actually have a longer lasting effect than the funding 
itself (behavioural additionality). There is evidence on the added value of 
complementary services – networking helps to connect to new knowledge through 
external actors (e.g., investors, test users, academia).  
It would be important to further investigate the importance of coaching and advice 
services, related to some government-funded R&D Programmes (Forfas, 2012; and 
Ploder et al., 2015) on the outcomes of the funded projects. 
6. The high growth literature (see, for instance, Helleman et al, 2017 among others) 
strongly underlines the importance of networks. The potentially dissimilar effects 
between collaborative grants and single recipient grants should be studied in order to 
see the importance of collaboration on innovativeness of the outcomes.  
7. Tax incentives and grants are complementary as regards to their impact on firm's 
growth and innovation activities given the evidence of higher impact of combined 
application (tax incentives and grants). They should not be regarded as policy 
options but rather as a set of tools in the policy box. 
 
9.1 Limitation and suggestions for future research 
Our contribution to the existing literature is to shed some more lights on the impact of 
R&D grants for supporting innovative firms with growth potential. In particular, we have 
contributed to the existing knowledge by synthesising available evidence on the output 
additionality effects of this type of R&D grants.  
However, this study is not without some limitations. Firstly, the analysis is limited due to 
methodological differences in the evidence base because of different time periods, 
econometric and other methods, and data caveats which do not allow a deeper 
comparative analysis of the impact of R&D grants. While being more insightful into the 
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design and implementation features, combining them with econometric methods may 
result in a more robust, comparable empirical evidence. There is a need for improving 
the quality of evaluations of existing policies.  
Secondly, the differentiation between SME policy (focus on growth of SMEs), R&D policy 
(focus on innovative companies), start-up and scale-up policies (focus on growth of 
innovative SMEs) is oftentimes fuzzy.  
Potential avenues for future research include further investigating the impact of national 
R&D grants. In particular, a meta-regression analysis would help to gain further insight 
into the magnitude of the effects of R&D grants. It would be also interesting to analyse if 
the national R&I policies have a lasting effect on firm behaviour (e.g. increase 
of R&D personnel; setting up of R&D collaborative agreements). Finally, the 
signalling effect of the grants on equity funding in Europe would be important to explore. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Characteristics of included studies 
Table 1A. Characteristics of included studies  
Author/year Sample size Firm size Firm age 
Widmann (2016)  1936 firms 19 (median) 5 (Median) 
Guo et al. (2016) 2638  firms _ 10 
Koski and Pajarinen (2011) 
Start-ups, 
gazelles, 
and 
incumbents 
12 (average) 
start-ups 
(up to 5 
years old); 
gazelles 
(10% 
fastest 
growing 
firms among 
start-ups); 
incumbents 
(over 5 
years old) 
Autio and Rannikko (2016)  
160 NTBFs 
with growth 
orientation 
_ 6.7 years 
Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) 
735 
beneficiaries 
25 (average) 7 
Girma et al. (2010)  Plant: 4853 11 (average) start-ups 
Bronzini and Piselli (2016) 
1246 high-
tech firms 
39  (median) _ 
Colombo et al. (2012) 536 NTBFs 10 
young (0-
5)/mature 
(6-25) 
Grilli and Murtinu (2012) 247 NTBFs 77 
founded in 
1980 or 
later 
Soderblom et al. (2015) 1102 firms 
more than 10 
employees 
targeting 
new firms 
that are less 
than one 
year at the 
time of 
application 
Gans and Stern (2003) 
71 small 
firms (36 
employees 
on average) 
36 (average) _ 
Gicheva and Link (2016) 1878 firms 39 (median) _ 
Einio (2014) 1800 firms 49  (median) 10 (median) 
Howell (2015) 
7436 high-
tech firms 
_ 
6 (median 
age) 
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Annex 2. List of policy evaluations and academic papers 
Table 2A. Policy evaluations on R&D grants for innovative firms with growth potential 
Study Country 
Name of the 
policy 
measure 
Funding agency Objectives of the measure Eligibility criteria for firms 
Selection process 
and method 
CDTI (2015) Spain 
Research and 
development 
projects (PID) 
Center for 
Technological and 
Industrial 
Development (CDTI) 
Business R&D projects (PID) are R&D projects with an 
applied nature and are based on the development of new 
technologies. It allows single firms or a group of firms or a 
consortium, including outsources centres, research 
institutes, and universities, to apply for financing. The 
projects funded by CDTI aim at developing technologies 
strategic for growth and consolidation of the company. 
Companies with research 
projects with a high 
technological content 
_ 
Forfas (2012) Ireland 
Enterprise 
Ireland Propel 
Programme 
Enterprise Ireland 
The strategic objective of the Enterprise Ireland Propel 
Programme is to improve the overall economy of Ireland 
by: 1) increasing the number and accelerating the 
development of technology led start-up companies with 
scaling potential; and 2) utilising the infrastructure, 
capabilities and expertise that exist within the third level 
sector to strengthen industry/college linkages. 
Senior manager with 5 years 
plus experience; participant 
proposals should have a 
significant market opportunity, 
particularly in international 
markets, knowledge base 
business with some potential for 
intellectual property ownership; 
a realistic potential for 
substantial growth; a 
management team with a 
strong track record; a realistic 
expectation that the level of 
funding required to growth the 
business can be accessed 
Selection is based on 
short listing and an 
interview process.  
Ploder et al. 
(2015) 
Austria 
FFG APlusB 
Programme 
The Austrian Research 
Promotion Agency 
The AplusB centers act as bridge-builders between science 
(Academia) and business economy (business) with the aim 
of the chances of success of highly innovative and 
technology-oriented start increasing ups from different 
industries significantly. 
Innovative start-up projects 
which are typically technology-
oriented, relatively complex or 
demanding in terms of 
supervision and support needed 
Proof of concept 
Radauer and 
Dudenbostel 
(2014) 
Austria 
The Initiative 
for the 
Creative 
Industries 
"evolve" 
Federal Ministry for 
Sience, research and 
economy 
The initiative "Evolve" aims at supporting cultural and 
creative industries (considered highly innovative 
companies with a great economic potential) to create 
growth and jobs. 
Creative industries with 
innovation projects with a high 
technological content 
_ 
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The Evidence 
Network 
(2013) 
Finland 
The Young 
Innovative 
Companies 
(NIY) 
Programme 
The Finnish Funding 
Agency for Innovation 
and Development 
The NIY Programme offers support for young innovative 
companies to achieve rapid international growth. To be 
eligible, a firm must meet the following conditions: (1) it 
needs to exhibit good potential for rapid organisational 
growth in international markets; (2) there must be a 
comprehensive, high-quality business plan and capacity to 
implement it; (3) there needs to be evidence about 
promising business activities and customer references; (4) 
The firm must possess a competitive advantage with which 
it is possible to reach an important market position; and 
(5) the firm must have a committed and competent 
management team (Tekes, 2013). 
The NIY Programme is open for 
young (under six years old) 
firms that employee less than 
50 people with a maximum 
sales turnover of Eur 10M, or a 
balance sheet totalling at least 
Eur 10M. The firms must also 
have spent at least 15 percent 
of all business costs in research 
and development during the 
previous three years, and they 
must be domiciled in Finland 
Milestone design and 
the use of an external 
evaluation panel. 
Iris group 
(2015) 
Denmark 
Market 
Maturation 
Fund 
The Danish Enterprise 
Agency 
The purpose of the market fund is to promote growth, and 
employment in Denmark by helping companies to 
overcome market barriers and coming faster on the 
market with new, high-level products 
Private companies can apply 
individually or in consortia with 
other companies. 
Companies and 
projects are assessed 
on the basis of a set of 
award criteria: novelty, 
commercial potential, 
and competencies of 
the working team 
SQW (2015) UK Smart scheme Innovate UK 
The purpose of the SMART scheme is to accelerate UK 
economic growth by nurturing small high-growth potential 
firms to become high-growth mid-sized companies with 
strong productivity and export success. 
Smart is a competitive fund, 
available to SMEs in all markets 
and sectors. Three grant types 
are available: Proof of Market 
grants, Proof of Concept grant, 
and Development of Prototype 
grants 
_ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
Table 2B. Academic studies on R&D grants for innovative firms with growth potential 
Study Country 
Name of the 
policy measure 
Funding agency Objectives of the measure 
Eligibility criteria for 
firms 
Selection process and method 
Widmann (2016) Austria BasisProgrammem 
The Austrian 
Research 
Promotion Agency 
(FFG) 
 
The basic Programme supports 
individual projects of companies of all 
sizes (including Startup,) and 
industries through funding.  
 
Essential criteria for the 
funding are the innovation 
content, the technical 
difficulty level of the 
project, the economic 
exploitation prospects as 
well as the perspective that 
the project will intensify 
research activities 
Funded project are selected on the 
basis of the technical quality of the 
project and their commercial value  
Guo et al. (2016) China 
Innofund 
Programme 
The Innofund 
Administration 
Center (IAC) 
under the Ministry 
of Science and 
Technology 
The scope of the Innofund Programme 
is to facilitate and encourage the 
innovation activities of small and 
medium technology-based enterprises 
(SMTEs) and commercialization of 
research by way of financing, trying to 
bring along and attract outside 
financing for corporate R&D 
investment of SMTEs 
A firm is eligible if it has 
fewer than 500 employees, 
and has a leverage ratio 
lower than 70%. The 
Programme also requires 
that R&D investments 
should be more than 3% of 
the total sales, and the 
number of R&D employees 
should be more than 10% 
of the total number of 
employees 
Funded project are selected on the 
basis of the quality of the projects; 
firms with leading products in the 
market must exhibit good economic 
performance 
Koski and Pajarinen 
(2011) 
Finland R&D grants 
The Finnish 
Funding Agency 
for Technology 
and Innovation ( 
Tekes) 
The scope of the funding is to: 1) 
increase the number of starting 
enterprises, 2) enable financing for 
changes encountered by SMEs, and 3) 
promote enterprise growth, 
internationalisation and exports 
A firm's potential for rapid 
(international) growth is 
one pre-requisite for R&D 
funding targeted to young, 
innovative companies 
_ 
Autio and Rannikko 
(2016) 
Finland NIY Programme 
The Finnish 
Funding Agency 
for Technology 
and Innovation 
(Tekes) 
NIY is the Finnish policy initiative that 
explicitly targets high-potential new 
firms. 
The NIY Programme is open 
for young (under six years 
old) firms that employ less 
than 50 people with a 
maximum sales turnover of 
10M and a balance sheet 
totalling 10M at most. The 
applicants must also have 
recorded at least 15% R&D 
expenditure during the 
previous three years, and 
they must be domiciled in 
Finland. 
The NIY Programme applies milestone 
design and uses an external evaluation 
panel. Participants need to meet their 
milestones in order to remain in the 
Programme. The panel assess 
participants' growth potential, 
development needs, and their 
suitability as an investment target. 
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Girma et al. (2010) Ireland R&D grants Enterprise Ireland 
R&D grants for firms' growth and 
internationalisation 
Projects are eligible in 
manufacturing industries if 
they will produce i) 
products for sales primarily 
on world markets, ii)  
products of an advanced 
technological nature and iii) 
products for sectors of the 
Irish market which are 
subject to international 
competition 
_ 
Bronzini and Piselli 
(2016) 
Italy R&D grants 
Emilia-Romagna 
region 
"Regional Programme for Industrial 
Research, Innovation and 
Technological Transfer" 
All firms that are willing to 
implement innovative 
projects in Emilia-Romagna 
region are eligible 
Funded project are selected on the 
basis of the degree of innovation, the 
congruence between the project's 
financial plan and its objectives; past 
experience and managerial 
competence 
Colombo et al. 
(2013) 
Italy R&D grants 
Italian 
government 
R&D grants targeting new firms in 
high technology sectors, and aimed at 
the creation and support of academic 
start-ups 
_ 
Projects are assessed and ranked on 
the basis of two main criteria: 
profitability and social impact of the 
projects 
Grilli and Murtinu 
(2012) 
Italy R&D grants 
Italian 
government 
R&D grants targeting new firms in 
high technology sectors, and aimed at 
the creation and support of academic 
start-ups 
_ 
Projects are assessed and ranked on 
the basis of two main criteria: 
profitability and social impact of the 
projects 
Soderblom et al. 
(2015) 
Sweden 
The Programme 
VINN NU (Win 
Now) 
The Swedish 
Governmental 
Agency for 
Innovation 
Systems 
(VINNOVA) 
This Programme targets new ventures 
that are less than one year of age at 
the time of application, that are in the 
process of developing a unique and 
innovative product or service, and that 
are development-oriented and wish to 
expand. 
Recipients must have a 
developed idea and proof of 
concept. 
In a first step, internal experts screen 
all applications. In a second step, the 
external experts evaluate the 
applications utilizing a standardized 
form rating them on a scale from one 
to six. 
Gans and Stern 
(2003) 
US SBIR Programme Federal Agencies 
The goals of the Programme are: 
i)increase the commercialisation rate 
of innovations, ii) enhance the 
competitiveness of small firms in 
technology-intensive industries, and 
iii) enhance the participation of small 
firms in the Federal contracting 
process 
The SBIR defines a small 
business as a US-owned 
firm with less than 500 
employees 
External experts review applications 
according to three criteria: 1) Strength 
of the scientific/technical approach, 2) 
Ability to carry out the project in a cost 
effective manner, 3) commercialization 
impact. 
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Gicheva and Link 
(2016) 
US SBIR Programme Federal Agencies 
The goals of the Programme are: 
i)increase the commercialisation rate 
of innovations, ii) enhance the 
competitiveness of small firms in 
technology-intensive industries, and 
iii) enhance the participation of small 
firms in the Federal contracting 
process 
The SBIR defines a small 
business as a US-owned 
firm with less than 500 
employees. Phase I for the 
assessment of the R&D' 
scientific and commercial 
potential; Phase II for the 
development of the Phase I 
technology and ideally to 
bring it to 
commercialization. 
External experts review applications 
according to three criteria: 1) Strength 
of the scientific/technical approach, 2) 
Ability to carry out the project in a cost 
effective manner, 3) commercialization 
impact. 
Einio (2014) Finland R&D projects 
The Finnish 
Funding Agency 
for Technology 
and Innovation 
(Tekes) 
To encourage firms to start up new 
R&D projects and accelerate the 
completion of ongoing ones. 
The main criteria for being 
selected into the 
Programme are commercial 
potential, technological 
challenge, available 
resources and the 
importance of the agency's 
support to the success of 
the project. 
_ 
Howell (2015) US SBIR Programme 
Department of 
Energy 
To strengthen the US high-technology 
sector and support small firms. 
Eligible applicants are for-
profit, U.S. based, and at 
least 51% American 
owned-firms with fewer 
than 500 employees. 
External experts review applications 
according to three criteria: 1) Strength 
of the scientific/technical approach, 2) 
Ability to carry out the project in a cost 
effective manner, 3) commercialization 
impact. 
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Annex 3. Regression output of the econometric studies used in chapter 4 
Table 3A summarizes the information for the interpretation of the coefficients. It reports 
the definition of the dependent variable, the definition of the explanatory variable, and 
the estimation method for each econometric study used in chapter 4.  
 
Table 3A. Regression output of the econometric studies (used in chapter 4) 
Study 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variable 
Estimation 
method 
Coefficients 
Impact on firm employment 
Girma et al. (2010) Log of employment Dummy: Grant OLS estimation 0.189*** 
Koski and Pajarinen 
(2011) 
Employment 
growth 
Dummy: Grant 
2SLS random 
effect 
0.205*** (Start-
ups up to 2 y.) 
 
Koski and Pajarinen 
(2011) 
Employment 
growth 
Dummy: Grant 
2SLS random 
effect 
0.047*** (Start-
ups up to 5 y.) 
 
Koski and Pajarinen 
(2011) 
Employment 
growth 
Dummy: Grant 
2SLS random 
effect 
0.017*** 
(Incumbents -
over 5y.) 
 
Colombo et al. (2013) Log of employment Dummy: Grant FE-IV estimation 0.564*** 
Soderblom et al. (2015) Employment Dummy: Grant OLS estimation 0.141* 
Einio (2014) 
Log difference of 
employment from 
t-1 to t+1 
Dummy: Grant IV estimation 
 
0.848*** 
Impact on firms' economic and innovative performance 
Guo et al. (2016) 
Log of the values 
of the sales from 
new products 
Dummy: Grant FE estimation 0.582*** 
Guo et al. (2016) 
Log of the export 
volume 
Dummy: Grant FE estimation 0.416*** 
Autio and Rannikko (2016) Sales growth NIY Programme 
Difference-in-
difference 
estimation 
1.20 (two-years 
span) 
1.30 (three-
years span) 
Grilli and Murtinu (2012) 
Firm Total Factor 
productivity 
Dummy: Grant GMM estimation 
0.25*** 
 
Soderblom et al. (2015) 
Average annual 
sales 
Dummy: Grant OLS estimation 0.112* 
Gans and Stern (2003) Log of revenue SBIR project OLS estimation 0.653*** 
Einio (2014) 
Log difference of 
sales from t-1 to 
t+1 
Dummy: Grant IV estimation 0.912*** 
Howell (2015) 
Achieving Revenue 
(commercialization
) 
Dummy: Phase 1 
Grant 
OLS estimation 
for binary dep. 
Var. 
0.11*** 
Gicheva and Link (2016) 
Dummy= Phase II 
project was 
commercialised as 
either a product, 
process, or service 
Dummy: 
additional 
funding to Phase 
II award 
Probit model 0.180*** 
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Impact on firms' innovative activities 
Widmann (2016) Patent application Funding approval 
Fuzzy Regression 
Discontinuity 
model 
0.108** 
Guo et al. (2016) 
Total number of 
patent 
Dummy: 
Innofund grant 
FE estimation 0.132*** 
Guo et al. (2016) 
Total number of 
invention patents 
Dummy: 
Innofund grant 
FE estimation 0.086** 
Bronzini and Piselli (2016) Patent application Dummy: Grant Logit estimation 
0.691*** (All 
firms) 
Bronzini and Piselli (2016) Patent application Dummy: Grant Logit estimation 
1.114** (Small 
firms) 
Bronzini and Piselli (2016) Patent application Dummy: Grant Logit estimation 
0.191 (Large 
firms) 
Notes: In a semi-logarithmic regression, the coefficient β needs to be transformed as exp
β 
to give a proper 
interpretation of the coefficient. 
 ** and *** significant at 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Annex 4. Project additionality 
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the project additionality. However, our 
evidence from policy evaluations (i.e. gathered through interviews) can shed light on the 
importance of R&D grants for young innovative firms with growth potential. 
The UK Smart Programme asked beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to report whether 
they would have progressed with their project in the absence of a Smart award. Around 
40% of surveyed beneficiary firms would have taken forward their project if they had not 
been successful in their Smart application, by using their own funds, equity finance or 
other public sector Programmes. 57% of non-beneficiaries carried out the project 
without a Smart award but facing delays and compromising the quality of the result. 
50% of the Austrian AplusB Programmes would have carried out the projects without the 
AplusB support. Respondents to the Finnish NIY (innovative young firms) Programme 
survey were asked whether they were able to raise external funding with only 34% being 
able to do so (as compared to 28% of the firms that applied but were not accepted to 
the NIY Programme). This shows that for the significant proportion of beneficiaries those 
grants are the source of finance for their innovative projects. Yet, it has to be stressed 
that all the evaluations were conducted in countries offering a mature system of direct 
and indirect R&D measures and mature equity markets. It would be interesting to 
compare those results for the countries having a more restricted financial offer for young 
innovative companies.  
Table 4A. Project additionality: Evidence from policy evaluations 
Study Country Policy initiative Data Period Deadweight 
The Evidence 
Network (2013) 
FI The NIY 
Programme 
108 companies 2013 34% of the NIY 
participating firms 
SQW(2015) UK Smart Scheme 513 SMEs 2012-2013 40% of surveyed 
beneficiaries;  
Ploder et al. 
(2015) 
AT ApluB 
Programme 
- 2007-2014 50% of the 
surveyed firms 
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Annex 5. Lessons learnt on the econometric approaches 
Some econometric issues emerged from our selected empirical studies: 
 Selection bias. The main problem with the empirical evaluation of the impact of 
economic and fiscal policy Programmes is that their instruments are typically non-
randomly assigned, and, as a result, groups of supported and unsupported firms are 
not directly comparable. Moreover, participants of a public policy Programme differ 
from non-participants in some characteristics which are seldom observed by the 
researcher. For instance, funding bodies usually tend to select those firms that 
promise high innovation success and possess strong capabilities to transfer 
innovation into economic performance. It is plausible that firms with higher 
capabilities provide a project in accordance with funding bodies, which may 
overestimate the actual effect of R&D grants. In this case, the ordinary least 
squares approach (OLS) and other methods are likely to yield biased estimates of 
the causal effect of the Programme. In the empirical literature, several different 
strategies have been developed to address this potential bias, including difference-
in-difference estimators, selection correction models, instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation and non-parametric matching approaches. The difference-in-difference 
method requires the existence of observations before and after the treatment 
(change of subsidy status). The IV estimators and selection models require valid 
instruments for the treatment variables. Matching is based on the idea that a 
counterfactual situation for companies that are not treated can be estimated from 
the sample of companies receiving the subsidies. The matching estimator consists of 
creating a set of firms that is comparable to the set of firms in the treated sample if 
firms, conditional on a set of a priori defined characteristics. More recent studies use 
randomized trials to eliminate selection bias. In randomised experiments the 
evaluator or Programme administrator randomly allocates firms to either a 
treatment or a control group. This ensures that we are comparing apples to apples, 
that is, that the firms of different sectors and size (or other specific characteristics) 
are otherwise comparable.  
 Measurement errors. Measurement error in explanatory variables is part of the 
error term in the regression equation thus creating an endogeneity bias. The 
measurement error in the explanatory variables causes OLS estimates of the 
coefficients to be biased and invalidates standard errors, t tests, and F tests. To 
address this problem, most empirical studies use the instrument variables (IV) 
approach. An instrumental variable estimator is used when one has data on an 
explanatory variable in the regression model but OLS would give inconsistent 
estimates because the explanatory variable is not distributed independently of the 
disturbance term. The instrumental variable is used to replace the original 
explanatory variable in the estimator, this making estimates consistent.   
 Unobservables. There may be unobservable variables which may affect outcome 
variables. For instance, the management capability of executives may affect a firm’s 
R&D investment, or a firm may have a greater probability of receiving support when 
it is located in a city or a county where local governments provide more support to 
local firms. This issue of unobservable variables can be addressed using an IV 
instrument variable approach. Guo et al. (2016), for instance, use two interesting 
instrumental variables (IVs): the total number of firms in high-tech areas of the city 
where the firm is located34, and the ratio of total investment in fixed assets made by 
local governments over the total GDP at the county level. As Guo et al. (2016) 
argue, both instrument variables are intended to capture the effort level of the local 
governments in developing the local economy.  
 Modelling distributions. Many variables, like employment and sales, have 
continuous distributions. These distributions can change in ways not revealed by an 
                                          
34 According to Guo et al. (2016), high-tech zone is a particular type of special economic zone in China where 
central and local governments seek to attract foreign direct investment and consequently stimulate the 
local economy. 
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examination of averages, for example, they can spread out or become more 
compressed. A useful and powerful econometric tool to study such distributions is 
the quantile regression. It allows seeing whether participation in a R&D Programmes 
affects employment distribution as well as average employment, and how it varies 
conditional on covariates such as firm characteristics (e.g. age and size). 
 Data confidentiality. A possible reason for the scarce attention from academic
literature devotes to this issue is probably the fact that little data is available to
provide evidence of the extent that R&D grants impact on performance among high-
growth innovative firms. For reasons of anonymity and confidentiality (i.e. the
agency does not disclose the identity of successful and unsuccessful applicants to
the public), most data on applicants and non-applicants are hard to retrieve.
 Type I Error and Type II Error. These tend to occur when there are changes in
firm names in different databases and over time. A way to overcome this problem is
to refer to legal person codes.
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